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This thesis aims to look at the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) with specific reference to their impact on South Africa ' s abi li ty to combat HIV 
and AIDS. It begins by looking at the history of patents and intellectual property rights 
and illustrates why and how the TRIPS Agreement came into existence. The TRIPS 
Agreement exemplifies the disparities between developed and developing countries and 
this can clearly be seen with regard to the provision of anti-HIV and AIDS drugs. The 
developing world deals with the bu lk of the HIV and AIDS epidemic whi lst the 
developed world holds most of the patents on the medication needed to treat those living 
with HIV and AIDS. This situation lends itself to a rift between patient rights on the one 
hand , and patent rights on the other. Traditionally the state has been the provider of rights 
such as health, but TRIPS alters this to include strong patent protection that is in line with 
neo liberal doctrine. The thesis examines these tensions with specific reference to South 
Africa ' s abi lity successfully to implement programmes to combat HIV and AIDS. 
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The law. in ifS majestic eqllolit)"jhrbids the rich 
as well as the poor ... to steal bread. 
Anatole France (1844 - 1924). 
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Introduction 
With the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, states either had the option of 
abiding by its regulations and gaining the advantages offered by the WTO at a certain cost, or refusing 
the regulations and facing exclusion (Narlikar, 2005: 25). The Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) provided rules governing intellectual property rights (lPRs) on a global sca le . 
It was the first time that such a global patent regime had been enforced and it required governments to 
change their national legislation (Narlikar, 2005: 81). Many countries had existing laws regarding the 
protection ofIPRs but few pertained to the protection of pharmaceuticals. TRIPS changed this. The 
inclusion of pharmaceutical products in the agreement was one of the developing countries' main 
concerns (Alsegard, 2004: 3). This is because health care is one of the prominent concerns faced by a 
developing country. 
It is important to note the main driving forces behind TRIPS. Shiva (200 I: 18) argues that in 
order to maintain its supremacy, the United States (US) made intellectual property (lP) and patents its 
primary asset for economic growth and for control of world trade. Despite its benefits to the developed 
world, a heavily regulated global patent system would also provide developmental opportunities for 
developing countries. TRIPS advocates are quick to point out that the regulations would also provide 
incentives for developed countries to invest in developing countries. It was only as time progressed that 
it became clear that TRIPS was not living up to its promise. Patents have been blamed for a whole series 
of economic ills, real or imaginary, "i ncluding high prices, erection of barriers to free trade, foreign 
domination of national economies, exploitation of developing countries and suppression of worthwhile 
inventions" (Grubb, 1982: 219). 
Since its inception, then, TRIPS has faced criticism- but it was only when South Africa tried to 
change its legislation in December 1997 to allow cheaper medication costs for the treatment of HIV and 
AIDS that the global community became more fully aware of the implications of the TRIPS Agreement, 
particularly for poorer nations (Thomas, 2001: IS). 
South Africa, like the rest of the African continent, faces a huge HIV and AIDS epidemic. It has 
over 5 million people living with HIV and AIDS. Although the problem is not restricted to developing 
countries, those have a much higher HIV infection and AIDS fatality rate than developed countries. As 
much as 95 percent of the world's HIV and AIDS population live in developing countries, with 70 
percent of those residing in Sub-Saharan Africa (Katz, 2003). All the same, in the US, AIDS is the fifth 
leading cause of death in people 25-44 years of age and the total number of reported deaths from AIDS 
is 438795 (Thomas, 2001: 11). Furthermore there is more money available in the developed world in 
relative and absolute terms but this wealth is cartelized and rests in the hands offew. The truth is that, 44 
percent of the world's population live under the $2 per day poverty line and consume only 1.3 percent of 
the global product, whereas the high income countries, which are home to only 4 percent of the world's 
population, consume 81 percent of the global product (Pogge, 2005: I). As a former Director-General of 
the World Health Organization (WHO), Dr Brundtland, state: "never have so many had such broad and 
advanced access to healthcare . But never have so many been denied access to health. The developing 
world carries 90 percent of the disease burden, yet poorer countries have access to only 10 percent of the 
resources that go to health" (The World Health Organization, 2007). While poverty is one of the many 
reasons why this rate is higher in the developing world, inability to afford medication to combat the 
disease is clearly a significant factor affecting attempts to curb the disease (Joseph, 2003: 428). But as 
Grubb (1982: 248) points out, pharmaceutical companies do not pretend to be the Red Cross. They are 
profit oriented and given the global economy in which they operate, have to be. Whereas high prices 
might make access to drugs selective, it is better to have a drug that is available to some than not 
available to any (Joseph, 2003: 431). On the other hand, the pharmaceutical industry is one of the most 
profitable in the world. In 2000 sales of more than $315 billion were made, which is more than the 
combined gross domestic product (GDP) of all 13 countries in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (Geffen, 2001). 
The high prices of antiretrovirals (ARVs) and the exorbitant profits made by the pharmaceutical 
industry were thus called into question. "Growing international condemnation of the excessive price of 
patented HIV and AIDS medicines finally forced trade ministers to address the thorny issue of global 
patent rules at the WTO Ministerial Conference" (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 4). On November 14 of that 
year the Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (Doha Declaration) was 
adopted which "affirmed the right of all countries to protect public health" (Alsegard, 2004: 4). This 
provided for a government to overthrow patent rights (by allowing parallel importation and compulsory 
licensing) if its country was facing a national health crisis, such as that of HIV and AIDS (Sacco, 2005: 
106). 
Where South Africa is concerned, as Anderson (2002) argues, the provision of health care is 
constrained by structural economic problems, wealth being one of these. Pharmaceutical patent abuse is 
also a central obstacle to implementing treatment programmes successfully (Geffen, 200 I). In this way 
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TRIPS is seen as an obstacle to the realization of the human right to health (Anderson, 2002). Although 
the TRIPS Agreement does not take developmental , social and environmental concerns into account, 
there are other factors, such as weak health infrastructure and poor planning that also contribute to the 
lack of this realization (Khor, 2001: 46). Perhaps the most poignant reason for linking the problem to the 
human rights issue is the government's failure to provide progressive realization on issues such as the 
HIV and AIDS link as well as mother-to-child (MTC) transmission (Anderson, 2002). Progressive 
realization is specified in Section 26(2) of the South African constitution, which outlines the minimum 
core obligations the government is obliged to take to realize rights such as the right to health (Sacco, 
2005: 116). South Africa has also not " invoked the TRIPS flexibilities or utili zed flexibilities inherent in 
its own legislation"; nor has it declared a national emergency regarding HIV and AIDS (Sacco, 2005: 
107). Sacco (2005: I 10) adds that generally "a state's duties in relation to health can only be judged in 
terms of whether the state has a policy to progressively real ize it obligations, taking into consideration 
its available resources". 
Research question and method 
In li ght of the above, this thesis aims to exam ine how the TRIPS Agreement, which falls within the 
precincts of the WTO, hampers a response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in South Africa. 
The main research question that this thes is sets out to answer is, then: what impact, ifany, does 
the TRIPS Agreement have on a developing country, like South Africa and what leverage does South 
Africa, facing a huge HIV and AIDS epidemic, have in terms of meeting the requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement, while also meeting the needs of its citizens? This will be achieved by documentary analysis 
and is largely a study of secondary literature. Therefore no primary research will be undertaken nor will 
the study be based on any hypothesis testing. Types of consulted documents include newspapers, books, 
biographies, papers prepared by organ izat ions such as Oxfam,journal articles, the South African 
constitution and law reports, the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. 
Structure 
The research question will be considered by providing a historical account of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) in order to contextualize the TRIPS Agreement and illustrate the legal and moral tensions 
between protecting IPRs and ensuring the right to health when treating HIV and AIDS patients in South 
Africa. The South African government's response to the epidemic will also be discussed to ill ustrate, not 
only how domestic factors constrain action, but also how the TRIPS Agreement confines the 
government's response to the ep idemic in South Africa. 
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In particular, chapter one outlines the history of patents and how IPRs came into existence and 
begins to illustrate the central issues that arise as a result of the protection of intellectual property by 
patents. It demonstrates how the TRIPS Agreement developed according to the demands of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the US government, and starts to explore the so called North-South 
dichotomy. 
The second chapter further di scusses the differences between the developed and developing 
world with reference to HIV and AIDS medication, by citing the factors that led to the Doha Declaration 
on Public Health which allows a country to place patient rights before patent ri ghts. The provisions 
outlined in the Doha Declaration are also di scussed. However, despite these provisions with regard to 
the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries are not readily using them. 
Chapter three examines the reasons for this and finds that, because of the epidemic and the 
different pharmaceutical market, equal opportunity to utilize the provisions does not present itself. And 
precise ly because of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, the legitimacy of IPRs are called into question 
because they directly inhibit the realization of the right to health . The works of Robert Nozick and John 
Rawls are used to clarify which should take preference. 
Finally, in chapter four, it will be shown that, although pharmaceutical companies are gu ilty of 
charging excessive ly high prices for HIV and AIDS medicines, the government is traditionally 
responsible for ensuring the protection and reali zation of human rights . Thus thi s thesis looks at the 
domestic factors in South Africa that constrain action towards implementing a successfu l HIV and AIDS 
programme. However, the external factors that also affect the domestic constituency are not ignored. 
In concluding, all of these factors will be linked together in order to show that the TRIPS 
Agreement has allowed international trade to enter the realm of intellectual property and why this in turn 
has given developed nations leeway to use trade issues as a bargaining tool to gain stronger intellectual 
property (IP) protection. Furthermore it will be shown that the Doha Declaration has not been honoured 
and that it is up to the South African government to resist international pressure to strengthen IP 
protection in order to address effectively the current HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
4 
1. Don't know much about IP: a short history of intellectual property rights 
Patents as they are known today only really became prominent in the 1980s with the introduction of 
IPRs during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round negotiations (Shiva, 
200 I: I). However it is important to explain developments prior to Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) in order to grasp the current intellectual property landscape and consequently why such 
rights should exist at all. The modern protection for intellectual property rights arose first as national 
legislation in developed countries, followed by international agreements such as the Paris, Rome and 
Berne Conventions which eventually led to the TRIPS Agreement l (Alsegard: 2004: 3). 
Intellectual property deals with products of the mind and one way of protecting such a product or 
process is with patents. A patent can be defined as a "legal device to encourage and reward invention by 
giving exclusive rights to inventors" (Black, 1997: 344). Before intellectual property, property law was 
tied to tangible objects. But intangible objects such as ideas can also be owned, and when ownership of 
this nature occurs it is known as intellectual property (Martin, 1995). The notion of owning an idea 
poses many challenges because of its intangibility. For instance some point out, as Hettinger (1989: 37) 
does, that any piece of intellectual work is always built on and inconceivable without the prior work of 
numerous people and therefore today's contributor cannot validly claim full credit. Similarly IP 
protection emerges because unlike physical property (tangible objects), intellectual property cannot be 
protected as easily. For example a CD could easily be copied and distributed, but the same could not be 
said for someone's house. Furthermore because of this intangibility, using others ' ideas does not seem as 
unjust as stealing a tangible object such as a car. This can be illustrated by looking at the number of 
individuals who justify downloading bootlegged movies off the internet but consider stealing a movie in 
its tangible form (e.g. on DVD or Video) from a store as unethical. The bootlegged movie can also be 
watched repeatedly while another person who has an original copy can do the same. Ideas can then, 
unlike tangible objects, be copied over and over again without reducing other people's use of the idea 
(Martin, 1995). Examples of patent protection can be observed as early as 500BC in Sybaris, Greece, 
where a food patent was granted which allowed for complete control of production as well as the profit 
going to the chefwho invented any exclusive or peculiar dish (Capsey, 1973: I). These "exclusive 
rights" are granted by the state for a limited period of time in respect ofa new and useful invention 
I The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1 C of the Marrakcsh Agreement Establ ishin g the World Trade Organization. 
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(Grubb, 1982: 3). Patents operate under the assumption that people expect rewards for their endeavors, 
especially when they are risky as they may and often do result in costly failure (Joseph, 2003: 431). 
Monopolies existed as long ago as the Byzantine Empire but these were not for inventions. It was only 
in 1449 that a monopoly was granted by Henry" for stained glass manufacture to John Utyman for the 
introduction of new technology into England (Capsey, 1973: 1-2). The first patent law was only passed 
in Venice in 1474 which covered both imports and inventions (Shiva, 2001: 14). These examples begin 
to illustrate that patents have long been used to encourage and reward inventions as well as promote the 
introduction and support of new industries. By the same token the capacity of patents to generate 
conflict also has a long history. 
In Britain, Queen Elizabeth I granted patent rights at her discretion but this soon led to heavy 
price increases and in 160 I the Queen was forced to revoke the majority of monopoly grants (Grubb, 
1982: 7). King James I continued granting illegal monopolies and thus protests against the granting of 
monopolies based on royal prerogatives eventually led to the Statute of Monopolies in 1624, which left 
the allocation of patents bound by common law (Grubb, 1982: II). Patents of invention were an attempt 
then to free the economy of the abuses of royal grants of monopoly privileges (Shiva, 2001: 14). Patents 
were also used by those countries, such as England, which lagged behind in the technology race to catch 
up with countries which were more technologically advanced (Shiva, 2001: 14). For example, Flemish 
weavers were encouraged to come into the country with the promise of a monopoly so that they cou ld 
teach English apprentices their craft (Shiva, 2001: 15). The 14-year monopoly so granted related to the 
time taken to learn a craft: two cycles of seven year apprenticeships and in this time it was also hoped 
that the invention would be put to good use (Cornish, 1997: 93). 
As a result in Britain, patents no longer related solely to the establishing of new industries and it 
thus became essential to disclose the invention (Grubb, 1982: 12). This meant that, when a patent was 
filed, the inventor would have to divulge the processes and methods which were used to produce the 
final product. Disclosure thus guaranteed a monopoly for the product (Grubb, 1982: 12). Despite these 
advances, the patent process was still lengthy and expensive, and there were also problems with 
enforcement. In 1852 a Patent Office was set up, which introduced a new patent system under the Patent 
Law Amendment Act (Cornish , 1997: 95). Renewal fees were introduced and a grant could be secured 
for a reasonable fee. There was also a call for an official examination of the invention before any patent 
was granted (Cornish, 1997: 95). In 1875 the courts decided on the legal scope of the monopoly. The 
Institute of Patent Agents was founded in 1882 and in the following year the patent office began 
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examining applications. Complaints could be made with regard to infringements, and fees were reduced 
(Grubb, 1982: 16-18). All of this fell under the Patents Act of 1883: an indication of how quickly the 
patent process developed. In 1919 Britain tried to locally produce chemicals that were patented in 
Germany, based on the argument that the patent was not able to be used domestically (Cornish, 1997: 
98). Key patents for many innovations in the chemical industry were held in Germany and therefore 
high prices for the chemical products were charged which made the chemicals inaccessible in many 
countries. 
Although the global patent system today is largely based on the US's patent system, the US's 
system was initially based on Britain's (Grubb, 1982: 14). In the US Constitution of 1778, Article I 
Section 8 grants exclusive rights to the inventor, and correct credit of inventorship was of absolute 
importance (Grubb, 1982: 13). The patent was granted to the first person who made the invention and 
not to the first who filed the patent for it. Patents were also used to promote technology transfer and 
provide incentives for the development of new inventions (Grubb, 1982: 25). The first patent system in 
the US had a strict system of scrutiny which eventually proved ineffective and in 1834 an Act was 
passed which allowed for a patent request without examination (Grubb, 1982: 20). However, this led to 
an overlapping of patents and in 1836 an examination system was set up that would be free of its 
previous faults (Grubb, 1982: 20). With an increase in the number of patents filed for both Britain and 
the US, and the desire to gain access to new technology from different countries, it became evident that 
each national patent system needed similar guidelines to adhere to. This became even more evident 
when foreign exhibitors refused to attend the International Exhibition ofinventions in Vienna in 1873 
because they were afraid that their ideas would be stolen and exploited commercially in other countries 
(The World Intellectual Property Organization, 2006). 
In 1883 patenting countries of the 19th century agreed to the Paris Industrial Convention of 1883 
which "guaranteed the nationals of each Member State the same treatment in the others as was given to 
their own nationals" (Cornish, 1997: 97). This meant that even countries without patent laws could join 
the Paris Convention and procure benefits for their own nationals abroad. It also allowed the inventor 
one year to file a patent in any other member nation after a patent had been filed in any member state 
(Bhat, 2005: 119). The Convention thus provided a framework by which countries could begin to set up 
their own patent system. It did not however make any arrangements, beyond its priority system, for 
standardizing or simplifying the process of applying for patents (Cornish, 1997: 100). South Africa 
joined in 1947. 
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In 1886 the Berne Convention/or the Protection 0/ Literary and Artistic Works was signed 2, 
which set minimum protection standards for its member states but this dealt more with protection of 
authors' rights and matters such as copyright (Cornish, 1997: 3 I 2). This marked one of the first 
occasions that IP was affected by multilateral covenants because, prior to this, IP regulation was 
confined to national legislation (Sykes, 2002: 49). Copyright laws would only apply to those objects 
created in a specific country; thus a book created in Belgium could only be protected by patent laws in 
Belgium. The aim of this convention was to help nationals of member states to obtain international 
protection of their right to control, and receive payment for the use of their creative works (The World 
Intellectual Property Organization, 2006). South Africa became a member in 1928. 
In order to process applications, two small bureaus were set up but in 1893 these two merged to 
form an international organization called the United International Bureaux for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (known by its French acronym BIRP!) which later, in 1970, at the Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, became WI PO (The World Intellectual 
Property Organization, 2006). WI PO " is an international organization dedicated to helping to ensure that 
the rights of the creators and owners of intellectual property are protected worldwide and that inventors 
and authors are, thus, recognized and rewarded for their ingenuity" (The World Intellectual property 
Organization, 2006). It is thus an organization dedicated to the promotion of world-wide intellectual 
property protection. It currently has 183 member states. South Africajoined in 1975. WIPO aims to 
provide a stable environment for the marketing of intellectual property products and in doing so help to 
"oi l the wheels of international trade" (The World Intellectual Property Organization, 2006). 
Despite these advances, problems still remained with unexamined patents and even with those 
that were examined . The high costs of examination kept low the number of patents filed (Cornish, 1997: 
101). The situation was rendered even more complex by the fact that many inventors wanted to file 
patents in several countries. It soon became evident that "the internationalizing of the patenting process 
might increase efficiency and reduce costs" (Cornish, 1997: 10 I). 
In 1963 a number of European countries signed the Strasbourg Convention "which 
recommended certain common standards for novelty, inventiveness, and the type of invention which 
may be patented" (Grubb, 1982: 25). It was this Convention that formed the basis of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) of 1973 which later led to the establishment of the European Patent Office 
(EPO) in 1978 (Grubb, 1982: 25-26). The Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) which came into effect on 
2 Signatories for 1887 include Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain. Switzerland, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. 
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June I, 1978, administered by WIPO, did not set out to create a world patent system but rather attempted 
to simplify the process (and reduce the cost) of filing for a single patent in several countries (Grubb, 
1982: 27). The aims were twofold: the first was to establish a standard international preliminary 
examination system which would establish the grounds of whether to grant a patent or not (Cornish, 
1997: 101). This was seen as an opportunity for developing countries because man y did not have their 
own guidelines for granting patents and could use this as a model. Secondly, the PCT aimed to have an 
international search conducted by international search authorities which would allow an applicant to 
institute applications in numerous countries by a single procedure (Cornish , 1997: 101). This was not, 
however, an international agreement about the grounds of validity for a patent; in the end each national 
patent office would decide. South Africa became a member in 1999. 
Internationally, subsequent discussions of acceptable global patent models focused on two 
negotiations: UNCTAD's Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology and the Revision Conference 
of the Paris Convention (Cornish, 1997: 99). The first had two drafts in 1980 but was surrounded by 
controversy because different versions were being preferred variously by the G77 (developing), 
industrialised and soc iali st countries (Cornish, 1997 : 99). The second held three sessions, but adjourned 
sin die in 1982. 
Meanwhile the expansion of trade competition after 19S0 brought many advantages to 
innovators, and patents helped secure immense commercial returns (Cornish, 1997: 17). After the end of 
World War 11 the international community wanted to build safeguards and institutions that would protect 
the world from the recurrence of such disastrous events, and many believed that free trade would 
provide just such protection (Narlikar, 200S: 10). At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the US 
and Britain provided the blueprint for structures for maintaining international economic co-operation. 
The three pillars of the Bretton Woods system were the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank and the International Trade Organization (ITO) (Vodovnik, 2004). The proposed formation of the 
ITO was enshrined in the Havana Charter, but this was rejected by the US Congress on the grounds that 
its broad mandate would compromise US sovereignty (Vodovnik, 2004). With the failure of the ITO, 
which was supposed to cover areas of commercial policy, employment, economic issues, fair labour 
standards and humanitarian concerns amongst others, an interim agreement, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was set up in 1948 until the ITO could be re-Iaunched (Narlikar, 200S: 12, 
IS). It was signed by 23 countries, II being developing countries. 
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The GATT appl ied only to governments and stood firmly outside of the boundaries of states by 
on ly dealing with tariff barriers (Narlikar, 2005: 15). Its aim was to reduce national trade barriers and to 
stop trade policies that had hobbled the global economy prior to World War II (Vodovnik, 2004). This 
stood in sharp contrast to the lTO's ambitions, which dealt with the monopolistic practices of 
commercial firms. Furthennore, ifany part of the GATT mandate clashed with a state's pre-existing 
legislation the state would not have to apply the GATT mandate (Narlikar, 2005: 16). GATT analyst 
Gilbert Winham has described GATT as a "formally-contracted, rule-orientated , non-organizational 
form of co-operation in international affairs" (Narlikar, 2005: 16). In other words, it was little more than 
a negotiating forum held togethe r by a multilateral treaty signed by contracting parties, and did not enjoy 
the same legal framework that an organization would (Narlikar, 2005: 26). For example, collective 
action could not be organized against individual countries if they did not adhere to a particular part of 
the GAIT mandate. The operations of the GATT, such as its negotiation methods, served to marginalize 
further the developing countries, but at the same time this marginalization served to ensure the 
participation and commitment of the major traders : the US, the European Community, Canada and Japan 
(Narlikar,2005: 19). 
It was precisely because of this marginalization of developing countries, which served the needs 
of the major traders and thus of GA IT's most powerful signatories, that GATT continued to exist for 
over four decades (Narlikar, 2005: 19). The first seven rounds of negotiations dealt primarily with trade 
tariffs, and it was only in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) that agendas of developing countries were 
considered. This was in response to the changing comparative advantage of the developed countries. In 
the early I 980s the US faced a decline in market competitiveness due to the ri sing economic power of 
Europe and Japan. This meant that US companies no longer dominated their domestic market and 
instead lost market share to better imports from abroad. When pol icy-makers reviewed the issues they 
found that, although technological innovation was still high , US entrepreneurs fai led to be competitive 
(i.e. be first in the market). This led to a shift from the previous view that patent monopolies shou ld be 
used sparingly, to the view that the patent system was not sufficiently strong to support the 
commercialization of investment in competitive new technologies (Lehman, 2004: 2) . As a result both 
political parties in the US began to strengthen the patent system, and even pharmaceuticals were 
included to compensate for the delay in their ability to market drugs due to safety regulations (Lehman, 
2004: 3). This strong intellectual property right protection was incorporated into the US position in trade 
negotiations. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1992 and replaced 
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the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, which did not include IPRs (Sykes, 2002: 50). NAFTA clearly 
stipulates what each member state should do to protect IP. According to the US International Trade 
Commission, if IP rights are protected in developing and least developed countries according to US 
demands, then US companies stand to gain $6 1 billion a year at a cost to the South of somewhere 
between $100-300 billion (Chomsky, 1993). The result of this shift was that the so-called new issues) 
were brought into the GATT mandate: called Trade Related Intellectual Property Ri ghts, Trade Related 
Investment Measures and serv ices (Narlikar, 2005: 20-21). There was much resistance from developing 
countries and the European Commission against the inclusion of these new issues because they believed 
that IP should stay within the boundaries of WIPO (Adede, 200 I: 5). The US, on the other hand , pointed 
to the fa ilure of WI PO to enforce adequate IP protection and maintained that GATT provided the 
necessary enforcement. The US also argued that developing countries wou ld be able to use their 
bargaining power to secure favourable terms (Adede, 2001: 9). The inclusion of TRIPS al so served to 
consolidate the US advantage in the cutting-edge knowledge-intensive industries (Bell , 2006). 
However, many countries were concerned that GATT did not provide the necessary structure to 
deal with these new issues. Although a proposal for a new international trade organ ization was not on 
the agenda in the Uru guay Round, it was inevitable that one would be needed to handle the new issues 
created by changing ci rcumstances. International trade lawyer 10hn lackson recognized that, unless a 
mechanism for coordinating agreements was found, the current agreements met would be unsustainable, 
so he proposed the creation ofa world trade organization (Narlikar, 2005 : 24). It was, then, changing 
imperat ives and the need for a new negotiation process that lead to the creation of the WTO. A world 
trade organi zation would also serve to maintain external relations between other organizati ons such as 
the IM F and the World Bank. Although Canada and the EU jumped at the opportunity to be part of a 
world trade organization, many countries, particularly the developing ones, sti ll had to be convinced. 
Developing countries were "granted the inclusion of agriculture and textiles, and also special and 
differential treatment through longer time periods for implementing some of the new agreements" 
(Narli kar, 2005: 25). Furthermore, they believed that membership would ensure increased fo reign direct 
investment (FDI) and promote technology transfer (Sykes, 2002: 59). Surprisingly, the US resisted and 
was the last to consent- in return for an EU concessio n on computer chips and a change in the name 
from a Multilateral Trade Organization to the World Trade Organi zation (Narlikar, 2005: 25). Countries 
3 They were called new issues because never before had intellectual property or investment measures been included in global 
dialogue relating to trade. 
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then either had the option of abiding by its regulations and gaining the advantages offered by including 
the new issues, or of refusing the regulations and facing exclusion. The WTO came into existence on I 
January 1995, with a membership of 128 countries, including South Africa. The WTO, although sharing 
some similarities with its predecessor, GA IT, differs in that it concerns itselfwith areas that have 
traditionally fallen within the domestic jurisdictions of states, namely non-tari ff barriers to trade and 
IPRs (Narlikar, 2005: 59). It is important to note that, unlike its predecessors, the WTO was not 
establi shed in response to a global crisis, and as Bell (2006) argues: " it was not global necessity that 
gave birth to the WTO in 1995". Rather the US realized that its interests were no longer being served by 
a loosely controlled GATT and that its interests could be better met by including new issues within the 
WTO, that strengthened and continues to strengthen their position. The Agreement on Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides provisions relating to all IP, introduces IP law into the 
international trade system and aims to provide minimum standards of protection with regard to IP on a 
globa l scale. TRIPS, then, is the international treaty for protecting international property (Sh iva, 200 I: 
95). 
TRIPS became final after many negotiations between 1986 and 1994. The decade-long 
movement, led by a coalition of industries in the US, united "to secure an international standard of 
intellectual property protections that could be enforced through trade sanctions" (Baker, 2003: 15). The 
entertainment, publishing, computer software and pharmaceutical industries in the US formed their own 
internal alliances which in turn strengthened the position of the US which then , using NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement) as a model, worked with other developed countries to motivate the 
importance of globalizing IP protections (Baker, 2003: 15). For this reason the WTO can be seen as 
blueprint for the global hegemony of corporate America (Bell, 2006). The first proposal of the TRIPS 
Agreement was tabled by the European Commission (EC) in March 1990, and was entitled the "Draft 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property" (Alsegard , 2004: 3). The US also 
submitted a draft of the same title. Many countries disagreed with the proposals in full or in part, fi ling 
additional proposals, but what the developing countries were most concerned about was the inclusion of 
pharmaceutical products in the agreement (Alsegard, 2004: 3). It is important to note that, although the 
pharmaceutical industry was not party to the agreement, it was a very powerful lobbyist (Alsegard, 
2004: 4) . The developing countries tried to create a coalition of the unwilling, but the US used its 
Section 301 Special Trade List to threaten unwilling nations and sp li t the alliance (Baker, 2003: IS). 
This meant that the US put " IP into the frame of inter-governmental trade negotiation, making it a 
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prominent part of bilateral agreements with countries such as Korea and Brazil , and using its Trade Act 
powers to block imports into its territory where a country did not come up to scratch on the IP front" 
(Cornish, 1997: 100). 
In June 1990 a "Chairman ' s draft" was put forward which combined all of the suggested 
proposals, and in further discussions it became clear that pharmaceutical patents needed to be discussed 
and debated at length (Alsegard: 2004: 3). TRIPS was signed at Marrakech in 1994 and caused much 
controversy. First, it required that governments change their national legislation. Second, the agreement 
also applied to basic necessities, such as medicines (Narlikar, 2005: 81). TRIPS then changed two 
important things: it strengthened the international dispute resolution capacity in relation to intellectual 
property, and it removed the individual state's discretion under the Paris Convention to determine the 
extent of patent protection (Sacco, 2005: 106). "Under its key patent provisions, member countries must 
provide patent protection, for a minimum of20 years from the filing date ofa patent application, for any 
invention, including a pharmaceutical product or process, that fulfils the criteria of novelty, inventive 
step and usefu lness" as stated in Article 33 and Article 27.1 respectively of the TRIPS Agreement 
(Baker, 2003: 15). Although countries have always had some existing system of protecting IP, because 
the risk ofa free rider problem would deter any would-be inventions and innovations (Narlikar, 2005: 
81) , it had always been up to each individual country to determine the inclusion of medicines. Article 
27.1 now spec ifically forbids their exclusion. Similarly it is no longer acceptable to di scriminate against 
imports in favour of locally produced products, "thus allowing major pharmaceutical companies to 
control the place of production" (Baker, 2003: 15). Article 28 secured the pharmaceut ical industry's 
rights to exclude others from making their product. 
Despite these limitations, the TRIPS Agreement does contain some flexibility. Article 6 allows 
for parallel importations and Article 31 gives the right to issue compulsory licenses. Parallel, or ' grey' , 
importing is when country A chooses to import the same patent brand drug from country B because the 
drug is sold for less in country B. Parallel importing, then, is not the importation of generic drugs in the 
case of pharmaceuticals. The TRIPS Agreement specifies that none of its provisions, except those 
dealing with national public health treatment, can be used to address the issue of parallel importing in a 
WTO dispute. This means that "even if a country allows parallel imports in a way that another country 
might think violated the TRIPS Agreement, this cannot be raised as a dispute in the WTO unless 
fundamental principles of non-discrimination are involved", as stated in Article 6 of the TRIPS 
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Agreement (The World Trade Organization, 2003). Compulsory licensing' is when a government allows 
someone else to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent holder (The 
World Trade Organization, 2003). Although mainly associated with pharmaceuticals, it cou ld be applied 
to other patents. A government is on ly free to use this option once they have unsuccessfu lly attempted to 
obtain a voluntary license from the patent holder (Article 31 b). In addition to thi s, if a compulsory 
license is issued , an adequate fee must be paid to the patent holder (The World Trade Organization, 
2003). However, for a national emergency or for government use there is no need to try fo r a voluntary 
li cense. A provision also exists for a country to begin work on a new generi c medicine before the patent 
of that drug expi res; th is is known as the Bolar provisions (Horton, 2000: 1541 ). These are only some of 
the lim its and flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement has to offer. Why, in sp ite of the drawbacks, would 
developing countries chose to sign? Narlikar offers three reasons: 
• As mentioned before the US imposed unilateral trade sanctions on developing countries for 
violating US patent law and placed several countries on their priority watch list. Thus deve loping 
countries saw TRIPS as an opportunity to curb unilateral trade sanctions with multilateral ones 
(Narlikar, 2005: 82). 
• Secondly there are the concessions that TRIPS offers exclusive ly for developing nations 
• Due to the technicalities of the TRIPS negotiation process many thought that the agreement 
would deal mainly with counterfeit goods6 (Narlikar, 2005 : 82). 
What the above brie f hi story of intellectual property rights has shown is that the protection of 
intellectual property is in no way novel. With increases in trade, technology and travel (the products of 
a globalizing world), greater need for intell ectual property protection has arisen. When plans for an ITO 
emerged, which later became GATT, it was hoped that free and fair international trade wou ld be seen as 
a means to foster international co-operation. With this v iew on trade being central, however, more 
commodities would become accessible to more countries and thus the risk or inevitability of copies and 
counterfeit technology as well as the resu lting products would increase. The TRIPS Agreement 
standardizes IP protection and ensures that individuals have a right to protect their ideas and the 
4 It is important to note that the term "compulsory licensing" does not appear in the TRIPS Agreement; instead, the phrase is 
"other use without authorizat ion of the rights holder", Compu lsory licensing is one fonn of "other use", 
5 The Bolar Provision allows testing and regulatory approval of generic versions of drugs before the patent expires, to ensure 
that generic copies can be introduced immediately upon patent expiry (Malpani & Kamal-Yanni, 2006). 
6 At the time developed countries had experienced a severe drop in exports due to the increase in trade of counterfeit goods. 
14 
resulting products. The pharmaceutical industry lobbied strongly for medicines to be included in the 
agreement, and one undeniable effect of TRIPS has been to consolidate the economic power and 
monopoly privileges of the proprietary drug industry (Baker, 2003: 16). Although there has always been 
some resistance towards the TRIPS Agreement in one form or another, no factor has more clearly 
illustrated the negative effects of the TRIPS Agreement than the problem of access to antiretroviral 
(ARY) treatment in light of the HIY and AIDS epidemic. 
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2. Big Pharma vs. Little Doha 
The TRIPS Agreement was the first time that essential processes and their resu lting products, like 
medicines, could be patented. Prior to TRIPS, a patent on a new pharmaceutical compound (called a 
composition of matter patent) would be shorter than the patent for its commercial process (Sykes, 2002: 
51). The inclusion of process patents was of particular interest to the pharmaceutical industry because it 
is not uncommon for a new compound to precede its commercial use. In fact the failure of many 
developing countries to protect process patents led the US to place them under their Section 30 I watch 
list (Sykes, 2002: 51). The argument for patents, put forward by the (mainly American) pharmaceutical 
industry, is that the cost of research and development (R&D) for these sorts of products is high, whereas 
the cost of production is low. For every new successful drug on the market, there are countless numbers 
of drugs that fail. The cost of these unsuccessful attempts needs to be recouped if the industry is to 
remain profitable. Patents ensure that the pharmaceutical company will earn back the money spent on 
R&D and also receive payment for introducing new technology that other companies or individuals can 
build on to improve the previous drug, thus providing the incentive for more R&D. During the TRIPS 
negotiations the greatest demands came from the American government (which was under immense 
pressure from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association PM A) to secure the extension of patent 
systems to chemical and pharmaceutical products (Cornish, 1997: (00) . Despite the inclusion of 
pharmaceuticals in TRIPS, developing countries signed for reasons already outlined. And although 
developing countries, including least developed countries, were given concessions such as an extended 
term to become TRIPS compliant7, the bulk of the TRIPS Agreement sets up blanket standards that 
apply to all signatories, despite their apparent differences. 
The TRIPS Agreement served to heighten the so-called North-South divide with regard to 
intel lectual property rights. Developed countries generate the bulk of new inventions and have 
hi storically maintained the greatest degree of national patent protection, whereas developing nations 
generate fewer new inventions, and have had little or no national patent protection (Sykes, 2002: 49). As 
a consequence developed countries often accused developing countries of piracy because they had 
benefited from techno logy developed elsewhere without having to pay royalties (Sykes, 2002: 49). 
However, not only are there differences within developing countries, developed countries and least 
developed countries, there are also differences between these categories of country. Ev idence seems to 
7 Developing countries had until 2005 and least developed countries have until 2016 to become TRIPS-complaint. 
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suggest that intellectual property benefits are dependent on the level of development in a country 
(Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 12). Similarly the markets for pharmaceuticals in countries with different 
development levels are also different. Kremer (2000: 69) distinguishes between the markets for 
pharmaceuticals in developing countries compared to those in the developed world. It must be stated 
that, even though much emphasis is placed on market distinctions, this factor, although dominant is not 
the only one and is in fact directly interrelated with other factors such as development. Market 
distinctions, as will be shown, begin to illustrate the problems associated with having a sole mandate 
governing intellectual property protection. 
Firstly, the market for pharmaceuticals in the poorest countries is tiny. Developing countries, 
where three-quarters of the world population lives, account for less than ten percent of the global 
pharmaceutical market ('t Hoen, 2002: 28). According to the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) only one percent of their market is in Africa, and this estimate 
includes South Africa (Kremer, 2000: 70). The majority ofPhRMA's market is in America (39.6 
percent), Europe (26.1 percent) and Japan (15.4 percent). However, developing countries spend a higher 
percentage of their health budgets on pharmaceuticals than developed countries (Kremer, 2000: 70). For 
example, for 2007 South Africa has allocated R48 billion to health , which is 12 percent of GOP. 
Regardless of the small size of middle income country markets, they are a significant growing source of 
revenue for pharmaceutical companies (Kremer, 2000: 70). ARV treatment in developing countries is an 
example. Medicines sans Frontiers (MSF), Oxfam and other NGOs showed that the most affordable and 
appropriate ARVs were blocked by patents in countries which represented 81 percent of Africa's AIDS 
burden (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 8). 
Secondly, "developing countries face a significantly different disease environment than 
developed countries due both to their poverty and their geography" (Kremer, 2000: 70). In low and 
middle income countries the disease burden consists mainly of infectious and parasitic diseases whereas 
in high income countries the burden mainly consists of noncommunicable conditions like cancer 
(Kremer, 2000: 71). Sub-Saharan Africa, unlike the rest of the world, deals with an HIV and AIDS 
epidemic of astronomic proportions. The region accounts for 70 percent of the world's HIV infections 
and 90 percent of AIDS-related deaths (Walker et ai, 2004: 106). With 4.7 million people living with 
HIV and AIDS, South Africa has the second largest population of people living with thi s disease in the 
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world, surpassed only by India8 And although there are many factors that are responsible for the rapid 
spread of HIV and AIDS in South Africa, one of them is widespread poverty and economic 
marginalization. There is a causal relationship between poverty and unemployment. Because there are 
not enough jobs for semi-skilled workers, "short term surv ival strategies frequently supersede 
considerations of long term well-being" (Barnard, 2000: 160), and many are thus forced to exchange sex 
for money or take lip casual job offers in risky areas which increases the risk of HIV transmission. 
There are thus considerable differences between the economic climates in developing countries 
and those of developed countries with reference to pharmaceutical markets. Furthermore, the bulk of the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic exists in the developing world. Although Sub-Saharan Africa comprises on ly 
10 percent of the global population, as has been mentioned the region accounts for 70 percent of the 
world's HIV and AIDS population (Avafia, 2005: I). The main problem was that, under TRIPS, ARV 
treatment was excessively priced, rendering treatment inaccessib le for those living with HIV and AIDS . 
It was thus perceived "as if the greed of the North and its industry was killing people in the South in 
their millions" (Alsegard, 2004: 4). The AIDS epidemic has made evident the fact that the cost of health 
care and drugs is becoming prohibitive in the entire world as a result of implementing TRIPS (Shiva, 
200 I: 86). HIV and AIDS is a global epidemic that defines the exc luded of the world and , even more 
importantly, it defines those who can purchase well-being and those who cannot (Barnett and Whiteside, 
2006: 6). While inaccessib ility to ARV treatment is also due to stigma, ineffective public health care 
systems, poorly trained health professionals as well as a lack of generic alternatives, inability to afford 
treatment is a major factor. As a result, although in theory the TRIPS Agreement has provi sions that all 
countries (developed, developing or least developed) can use, in practice these provisions are harder to 
implement if initiated by developing countries. 
In compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, the South African government introduced the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No 90 of 1997 (Medicines Act9) in order to 
fulfill the human rights commitment enshrined in the constitution. The Act arose in the context of 
increasing pressure on the South African state to provide ARVs to citizens, given a growing HIV and 
AIDS crisis. The Medicines Act was thus aimed at facilitating access to cheaper medicines in both the 
private and public sectors (Joni , 2002: 276). The Medicines Act would bring three important measures 
into place. 
8 Although India has just fewer than six million people li ving with HIV/AIDS this is only one percent of the population, 
whereas in South Africa. nine percent of the populati on is living with HIV/AIDS. 
9 The act can be found at http://www.gov.zalacts/ 1997/a90-97.pdf 
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• Firstly it would allow the South African government access to cheaper drugs by using parallel 
importation lO This was due to the fact that South Africa was facing higher prices for several medicines 
than were found in neighbouring countries and , in several cases, than in the US and Europe (Love, 
200 I). Parallel importation then involves shopping around for the cheapest price on a particular brand 
drug in a different country. This means, to use Love's example, that if South Africa permits parallel 
imports it will be able to use the Indian version of Glaxo ' s AZT but not CIPLA 's generic version of the 
same drug l 1 In the pharmaceutical industry price differentiation occurs among countries, with the US 
being the country with notably highest prices. ClPLA, a company in India , offered a version of a triple 
cocktail of antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV to African governments for $600 per person per year 
and $350 for the same course to an NGO in Africa. The same drugs cost between $10000 and $15 000 a 
year per person in the US . This is because "pharmaceutical regulation and prescription requirements in 
developed countries facilitate price di scrimination across countries by making resa le across national 
borders easier to block. As a result, price differentials between countries are often large" (Kremer, 2002: 
74). 
• Secondly the Act would compel pharmacists to dispense cheaper generic versions of off-patent l2 
medicines when presented with a prescription, unless the brand version was requested by the prescrib ing 
doctor (Joseph, 2003: 442). 
• Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the Act would also have forced the pharmaceutical industry to 
be more transparent about their pricing mechanisms (Mbali, 2004: 107). 
Consequently in response to the Medicines Act, the PMA, supported by 40 drug manufacturing 
companies (later 39 due to a merger), filed a lawsuit 13 against the South African government. The 
passing of the Medicines Act was also attacked by the European Commission (EC) and the US 14 by 
means of economic sanctions. The suit was then filed on 18 February 1998 to force South Africa to drop 
an amendment to its patent laws (Alsegard, 2004: 4). The complainants claimed that the Medicines Act 
violated South African patent laws and that, although TRIPS compliant, in addition to parallel imports 
the Act could be used to allow compulsory licensing. This in turn would lead to the international 
)0 Although in this case the South African government argued that they wou ld not use the Act to issue compulsory li censes 
but rather only for parallel imports. 
II Glaxo is a brand pharmaceutical manufacturer whereas CIPLA only manufactures generics. 
12 Off-patent means that the patent tenn has expired and that others are free to use, produce and market the product or process 
that has been patented. On patent means that the product or process is still protected by the patent. 
Il In the High Court of South Africa, Case Number 4138/98. 
14 The US placed South Africa on its list under Section 30 1, suspending duty-free access to its South African imports 
(Narlikar, 2005: 106). 
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exhaustion of patent rights. "Basically some countries have a 'first sale ' doctrine, also known as 
'exhaustion of rights', which says that the patent owner's rights are 'exhausted' when the product is sold 
for the first time, so the products can later be so ld in cross border trade" (Love, 200 1). A reasonable fee 
is paid to the patent holder when a compulsory license is issued, but this is only a fraction of the profit 
that th e patentee would receive if the brand product was so ld either as is or under parallel importation . 
The South African government opposed the lawsu it. Two years after the lawsuit had been filed , 
in January 2001, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) joined the South African government in its 
defense (Joni, 2002 : 276) by being allowed amicus curiae (friend of the court) status. The TAC's brief 
not on ly clarified the legal issues but also rooted the legal arguments in the reality of the AIDS epidemic 
in South Africa (Berkman, 2002: 154). Over little more than two months later, and despite going on for 
over three years, on 17 April 200 I the PMA withdrew their lawsuit and settled out of court. 
Although the Medicines Act was passed to make medicines more affordable in South Africa, it 
was the issue of access to HIV and AIDS medic ines that galvan ized pub li c opinion (Kasper, 2001: 14). 
The court case thus illustrated that an interpretation of the fl ex ibilities of TRIPS and their use for public 
health purposes needed clarification to ensure that developing countries could use its provisions without 
threat of legal or political challenge (' t Hoen, 2002 : 3 I). While the South African government had won 
its case, other developing countries were experiencing similar problems. 
Brazil was not only one of the first developing countries to implement a national HIV and AIDS 
plan but also has one of the most comprehensive AIDS plans in the world , which to date has been used 
as a bl ueprint by 31 countries ls . Brazil's programme includes access to free ARV treatment and that 
country is able to run a successful HIV and AIDS programme because it has the abil ity and capacity to 
manufacture drugs locally l6 Globally, the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry is ranked tenth in terms of 
expenditure, and manufactures 18 percent of the ARV domest ic demand (Bate & Tren, 2005: 2). Brazil 
is able to do this because pharmaceutical patents and processes were onl y granted and acknow ledged if 
they were registered after 1996 (Bate & Tren, 2005: 2). Several ARV drugs were registered prior to 
1996 and Brazil has thus been copying them legally (Bate & Tren, 2005: 2). The price of AIDS drugs in 
Brazil has fa llen by 82 percent over five years as a result of generic competition whereas the price of 
drugs with no generic substi tute has fallen by only nine percent ('t Hoen, 2002: 32). In the past eight 
"The director general of the WHO, Dr. Lee, even appointed Mr. Teixiera, head ofBrazi!,s AIDS plan, to formulate WHO's 
HIV strategy (The Kaiser Network, 2003). 
16 Although Brazil 's AIDS program is admirable there has been concern over the quality of the generics that are being 
produced as well as concern over diminished interest in R&D for ARV treatment. See Bate & Tren 2005 for more detail. 
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years, the number of AIDS-related deaths in Brazil has been reduced by 50 percent (The Kaiser 
Network, 2003). 
In February 200 I, the US took action against Brazil at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) over Article 68 of the Brazilian IP law ('t Hoen, 2002: 32). They tried to prevent Brazil from 
passing a provision in their patent law that requires a patent holder to produce locally (Kasper, 200 I: 
14). This decision, known as the 'local working ' requirement, enables Brazil to continue promoting its 
local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and in doing so to keep the costs of ARV treatment down. 
"This would allow the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory license for the local generic 
production ofa medicine should the patented product not be manufactured within Brazilian territory 
within three years of the issuance of the patent" (Bate & Tren, 2005: 3). The US argued that Brazilian 
law not only discriminated against US owners of Brazilian patents but that it was also in violation of 
Article 27.1 and 28.1 of TRIPS . The US then came under immense pressure from international NGOs, 
because many felt the US's actions would have a negative impact on Brazil's successful HIV and AIDS 
programme. Furthermore, Brazil had also offered assistance to developing countries by transferring 
techno logy in order to help them increase manufacturing capacity ('t Hoen, 2002: 33). On June 25, 
2001 , the US withdrew the WTO panel against Brazil , mainly due to strong public pressure. 
It is important to realize that the South African and Brazilian government would not have had the 
success that they did so easily and quickly without global mobilization. An important lesson that can be 
drawn is that global solidarity on social issues is very powerful (Geffen, 2001). NGOs have ensured this 
mobilization and thus have played a key role in guaranteeing access to medicines via the provisions in 
TRIPS . Not only did the TAC playa vital role in ensuring that the PMA withdrew their case against the 
South African government, but they have also charged large pharmaceutical corporations with excessive 
pricing. On September 19, 2002, the TAC lodged a complaint with South Africa's Competition 
Commission against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) (The Consumer Project on 
Technology, 2006). GSK and BI were found to have abused their dominant positions in the ARV market 
and had to extend the term of the compulsory license granted to Aspen Pharmacare, as well as grant 
three other compulsory licenses to different companies (The Consumer Project on Technology, 2006). 
Many other NGOs have also had similar success stories in various developing countries, but it was only 
in 1999 that MSF, Health Action International (HAl) and Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) 
organized the Amsterdam Conference on Increasing Access to Essential Drugs in a Globalized 
Economy, which brought together 350 participants from 50 countries and focused specifically on 
increasing access to medicines ('t Hoen, 2002: 33). The Amsterdam Statement, drawn up at the 
conference, called for health to be made a priority at the WTO Seattle negotiations and demanded a 
balance between the rights of patent holders and the rights of citizens in intellectual property rights 
regulations (The Consumer Project on Technology, 1999). The Amsterdam Statement wou ld ensure that 
both the implementation and interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement with regard to developing countries 
would be reviewed, and new avenues for ensuring R&D into neglected diseases would be explored. It 
has also served as a blueprint for the work of other NGOs. The continuous campaigning against the high 
prices that pharmaceutical companies were able to charge by NGOs ensured enough negative publicity 
to guarantee that the pharmaceutical industry would make changes. 
Throughout the South African trial, pharmaceutical corporations began offering new discounts to 
South Africa and other poor countries; for example, BI offered nevi rapine for free 17 (Barnard, 2002: 
165). Similarly, Britsol-Myers Squibb made an offer to reduce ddl and d4T to US$I per day, which 
means that the cost ofa month's supply ofa cocktail was reduced from R3000 to RI500 (Joni, 2002: 
279). However, as Joni points out, thi s offer only affected the public sector and not the private, which 
also provides ARV treatment to a large section of the community (2002: 279). To put things into 
perspective: even at reduced rates, ARV triple cocktai l therapy costs between $250 to $300 per person 
per year. To purchase treatment for four million at the cheapest price would cost $1000 million , and thi s 
is only the price for the medication; staff, roll out programmes and other factors and diseases still need 
to be included and considered. Thus even at reduced brand drug rates as well as generic rates, the 
government will still require financial assistance. 
What all this begins to illustrate is that patient rights can be put before patent rights. Even though 
IPRs are not a natural right but a statutory right, multi national corporations (MNCs) have naturalized 
this right to protect what they have defined as their rights as owners of intellectual property (Shiva, 
200 I : 97). As Toby Kasper, coord inator of the Access to Essential Medicines Campaign of MSF -South 
Africa, put it: "the case was less about technical provisions to reduce drug prices than it was about the 
rights of a government to place the health of its people before private interests", and although 
specifically about South Africa, the same reasoning widely applies to the other factors discussed. These 
developments served to question the hierarchy of rights that the TRIPS Agreement appears to protect, 
and illuminated the problems with the TRIPS Agreement and its practical consequences. Such 
developments thus began to pave the road forward to Doha. 
17 Albeit exclusively for the use of preventi on of mother-la-child HIV transmission. 
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In short, since the emergence of TRIPS, the developing world has been collaborating "to demand 
that public health be given a more meaningful role in the interpretation and implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement" (Baker, 2003: 17-18). It was in particular the African Group (all the African 
members of the WTO), headed by Zimbabwe, that pushed for clarification on how the TRIPS 
flexibilities could be interpreted and how far their right to use them would be protected. 
As a result, the June 200 I meeting had two clear clashing positions. On the one hand the EU and 
US advanced pro-pharmaceutical company positions and , on the other, the developing countries 
advocated the following: 
(I) developing countries have a broad spectrum of public health concerns, not just HIV and 
AIDS, and they are particularly concerned about the lack of research on so called neglected 
diseases; 
(2) patents raise prices and thus impede access to medicines; 
(3) developing countries should be free to use existing TRIPS flexibilities including compulsory 
licensing and parallel importation without being threatened by developed countries; 
(4) least developed members needed an extension of transitional periods beyond 2006; 
(5) developing countries need to be able to source generic medicines from exporting countries 
despite the "predominantly for domestic use" rule in Article 31 (I) of the TRIPS Agreement; and 
(6) developing countries need assurances that the data protection rules in Article 39.3 would not 
impede registration of generics 18 (Baker, 2003: 18). 
Initially the US denied that patent protection limited access to treatment due to high prices, 
insisted on limiting the discussion to diseases known as the big three (HIV and AIDS, tuberculosi s and 
malaria) and tried to restrict parallel importation (Baker, 2003: 18). However, after 9111 the US 
experienced an anthrax scare and threatened Bayer, who own the patent on ciprofloxacin, a preferred 
anthrax treatment, with compulsory licenses if Bayer did not supply the drug at low cost in the required 
amount. This quickly changed the US ' s stance, and on 14 November, 2001, the Doha WTO Ministerial 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (Doha Declaration) was adopted 19. 
" See Proposal from a Group of Developing Countries, IP/CIW1312 (October 4, 200 I). 
19 1t is interesting to note that, after the Third Ministerial Summit talks failed in Seattle in 1999 due to protests, the Fourth 
Ministerial Summit was held in Qatar, a remote monarchy where public protest is ruthlessly suppressed. 
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Designed by developing countries to counteract continuing trade threats and a crisis in medical 
care (Baker, 2003: 18), the Doha Declaration affirmed the right of all countries to protect public health, 
WTO member governments stressed that it is important to implement and interpret the TRIPS 
Agreement in a way that supports public health, by promoting both access to existing medicines and the 
creation of new medicines (The World Trade Organization, 2003), This is outlined in paragraph four of 
the Declaration and , while the Doha Declaration does not amend the rights and obligations laid down in 
TRIPS, it provides guidance for the interpretation of the relevant parts of the agreement (Alsegard , 
2004: 4), This is because it was agreed "that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health" (The World Trade Organization, 2003) , 
The Doha Declaration states that each member state has the right to grant compulsory licenses 
and has the freedom to determine the grounds for such a license (Alsegard, 2004: 5), The Declaration, 
then , allows for governments to determine what constitutes a national emergency- including, but not 
limited to, the HIV and AIDS epidemic- in which case the procedure for issuing a compulsory license 
becomes faster and easier (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 5), However, no African country, and this includes 
South Africa, has issued a compulsory license despite the public health crises with regards to HIV and 
AIDS, Furthermore, the declaration extends the transition period for least developed countries (LDCs) 
by another ten years, to 2016, on pharmaceutical products (Narlikar, 2005: 105), 
Since the Doha Conference there has been much debate on paragraph six of the declaration, 
which addresses the effective use of compulsory licensing (Alsegard , 2004: 5): " We recognize that 
WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement" (Paragraph 
six of the Doha Declaration), To reiterate: compulsory licensing is when a "government allows someone 
else to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner" (The World 
Trade Organization, 2003) and thus involves, in the case of pharmaceuticals, the production of generic 
medicines, Generic in this sense means copies of patented drugs or drugs for which patents have expired 
(The World Trade Organization, 2003), The Council for TRIPS was given until the end of2002 to find 
an appropriate solution but, when the proposal was put forward, the US was the only country to object to 
it (Alsegard , 2004: 5), The US argued that ' countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities ' 
should be limited to LDCs and should not include developing countries or countries that chose, for 
whatever reason , not to manufacture (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 10), Conversely the EC suggested that 
Article 30 be interpreted to allow countries to export health products and that Article 31, which states 
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that compulsory licenses can only be used to serve the domestic market, should be deleted (Mayne & 
Bailey, 2002: 10). This would mean that health products can be exported to those countries with no 
manufacturing capacity. However the EC did argue that this option should be restricted to 'exceptional 
circumstances'. The African Group (41 members), which was also backed by developing countries such 
as India and Brazil, proposed that Article 30 should either be deleted or that it should be interpreted in 
such a manner that exports of health products are permitted (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: I I). Developing 
countries were offended by the US attack on their sovereignty and by its suggestion that only a few 
diseases (TB, Malaria, HIV and AIDS) should be covered by the paragraph six solution (Baker, 2003: 
22). The majority of di seases listed by the US either had no effective treatment or had no viable medical 
treatment still under patent. This meant that "disfavoured countries would, according to Northern 
demands, have to favour AIDS patients over people with diabetes , or people with malaria over people 
with asthma" (Baker, 2003: 22). Almost all of the major causes of mortality and morbidity in Africa for 
which patented western drugs exist were excluded from the list (Sassen , 2003). This is problematic for a 
country with a HIV and AIDS epidemic. AIDS is a syndrome and thus it is opportunistic infections that 
cause death as a result of a weakened immune system. Hence, the need for treatment for opportunistic 
infections is equally important, as the necessity for ARV treatment. 
However, rich countries would, by such interpretation of Article 30, only be able to issue 
compulsory licenses because they have the productive capacity to do so, whereas poorer countries with 
no production capacity, or those which solely rely on imports, would not be able to use the provisions. 
There are currently only a handful of developing countries that have the necessary manufacturing and 
innovation capacity; these include Argentina, China, Korea, Mexico and Brazil (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 
7). It is also, as Alsegard argues, "economically insufficient to require domestic production for every 
medicine a country may need" (2004: 7). And although production capacity is a barrier to local 
production, other factors such as regulatory barriers, trade secrets and general know-how cannot be 
ignored. A deadline was set to find a solution, but so far this has been passed several times and no 
solution has been found. 
Even though in many developing countries most drugs are either not patented or off-patent, this 
does not help those who do not have the necessary infrastructure. Thus Article 31 of TRIPS is of no 
practical use to most developing and least developed countries. Furthermore those countries that do have 
the manufacturing capacity will not be able to produce vital new medicines that are put under patent 
because of the 20 year monopoly grant (Mayne & Bailey, 2002: 5). This illustrates once again that there 
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is a significant difference in treating countries equally and treating them the same. As Van Eeckhaute 
comments "What is at stake here is an issue of equal opportunities for all WTO members to enjoy the 
ri ghts granted by the TRIPS Agreement" (2002: 17). 
The Doha Declaration provides guidance for the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement where 
applicable and should give developing countries greater confidence to make use of the provisions 
without the US or drug companies bullying them over patent policies20• But since its inception various 
members (developed country signatories) have interpreted the declaration in very different ways 
(Alsegard, 2004: 10). T he fact that no developing countries or LDCs have used the provisions in the 
Doha Declaration needs to be examined. The next chapter sets out to explain thi s and, by doing so, finds 
that because of the HIV and AIDS epidemic and the different pharmaceutical markets, equal opportunity 
to use the TRIPS Agreement does not present itself. And precisely because of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic, the legitimacy and scope of inte llectual property rights is called into question because IP 
rights directly inhibit the real ization of the fundamental human right to health. 
20 See Oxfam ' s "US Bull yi ng: One Year after Doha" by Mayne & Bailey (2002) which shows that the number of complaints 
by the US has decreased but bilateral pressure from the US still continues in the fo rm of TRIPS-plus provisions. 
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3. Human Rights Patent Wrongs 
Intellectual property rights have to be discussed within the context of the global HIV and AIDS 
epidemic. When placed in context of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, intellectual property rights are called 
into question because of the demand for affordable and sustained access to pharmaceuticals needed to 
treat this disease and its opportunist ic infections (Berkman, 2002: 151). While AIDS in an individual is 
caused by a virus, the epidemic is as much an economic, social and political phenomenon as a medical 
one (Berkman, 2002: I SO). According to Barnett and Whiteside (2006: 171) 
Epidemic impacts are history-changing events. They terminate some lives, incapacitate others 
and stunt the capabilities of those who have to divert energy and time into care. In the end, 
suffic ient numbers of deaths and illnesses make a society take a path other than that which it 
wou ld previously have followed. This is impact. 
The HIV and AIDS epidemic increases morbidity (sickness) and mortality (death) in populations at 
preci se ly those ages where normal levels of morbidity and mortality are low, and it is from this that 
other impacts stem (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 172). It is estimated that each day worldwide there are 
1500 new HIV infections and 600 AIDS-related deaths (Walker et al: 2004: IS). Some 13.2 million 
chi Idren are orphaned every year as a result of the virus (Walker b, 200 I: 109). This trans lates into a 
health sector that is put under immense strain because not only are ARVs expensive and comp li cated to 
administer21, but opportunistic infections also need to be treated . 
Overall development is hindered by the epidemic. Household incomes decline as a result of 
having to care for family members living with AIDS (Walker b, 200 I: 110). Prevalence rates show that 
it is predominantly the breadwinner(s) of families that are at risk of contracting the virus, and as a result 
their life expectancy and economic act ivity dwindles. Those who are dependents, namely chi ldren and 
the elderly, have to take up the role of provider. Household budgets are stretched by medical expenses, 
with less left over for other important necessities such as food, clothing and education. "The financial 
impacts of HIV and AIDS on households are as much as 30% more than deaths incurred from other 
causes" (Walker et ai, 2004: 16). This means that a family living just above the poverty line will be 
forced into poverty. In much the same way as individual households are affected , so are the wider 
economic structures. For example, the South African agricultural sector has seen a decline in output due 
2L i.e. The cocktail needs to be taken at exact interval s daily and treatment cannot stop earlier because then resistant forms of 
HIV/AIDS will form that cannot be treated. 
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to farm labourers being sick, and this translates into a potential threat to food security (Barnett & 
Whiteside, 2006: 238). Similarly in the business sector there have been huge market impacts as a result 
of employee absenteeism due to HIV and AIDS and this in turn has affected domestic economic growth 
(Walker b, 200 I: 110). 
HIV and AIDS are thus an obstacle to realizing the human right to health and life as well as the 
right to development (Walker b, 2001: 110). Access to treatment is the first step in lessening the impact 
of HI V and AIDS. Also, it should be recognized that, when treatment is not available, less incentive 
exists to get tested, since HIV positive status is not only associated with social stigmatization but is also 
tantamount to a death sentence. Life-extending treatment has the potential to keep families together for 
longer, which in turn has crucial implications for the well-being of the next generation in countries 
where the current generation of adults has been decimated by AIDS22 (Berkman, 2002: 15 3). 
A fundamental conflict exists between two radically different strategies for dealing with the 
global AIDS epidemic: the dominant strategy is rooted in property and profit maximization and the 
insurgent strategy is based on the human rights to health and life (Berkman, 2002: 151). The inventors 
of ARVs have a right to their own ideas, but at the same time individuals also have a right to health. 
The pharmaceutical industry is like any other in one sense and, in another, completely different. 
In the first sense the industry consists of profit-oriented and-maximizing companies. This comes about 
because any pharmaceutical company has a responsibility to its shareholders to increase returns. The 
industry argues that, because it operates in the business world, it is unreasonable to expect it to be overly 
altruistic and charitable (Joseph, 2003: 436). As an executive vice president of Pfizer commented: "We 
are not the Red Cross. We are a for-profit company" (Cameron & Geffen, 2005: 184). Pharmaceutical 
companies feel the need to increase their profits, which means focusing on market share, investment 
returns, etc, and this in turn forces them to become more efficient, which translates into the cutting of 
costs. 
The argument in short is that, like any other company, pharmaceutical companies supply a 
commodity. Detractors venture to suggest the contrary: that medicine is not the same as I-Pods and 
shoes. Yet medication is a commodity because it can be owned, consumed, bought, traded , and donated, 
and to a large extent is subject to market forces. However, it is when the scarcity of a particular 
commodity has the capacity to threaten human well being on a large scale that its distinctiveness fro m 
22 For a more detai led discussion on the mitigating effects as well as personal testimonies, see Cameron, 2005, chapter seven. 
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other commodities becomes apparent (Pellegrino, 1999: 247). Pharmaceutical companies produce and 
manufacture medicines that improve the quality of people's lives as well as save them. The WHO 
defines ' essenti al medicines ' as those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population, and are 
selected with due regard to public hea lth relevance, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative 
cost effectiveness. Essential drugs should "be ava ilable at all times, in adequate amounts, in the 
appropriate dosage forms , with assured quali ty and at a price the indiv idual and the com munity can 
afford" (Matowe, 2004: 718). While in the case of other commodities there is a wil ling buyer who 
chooses a product, with prescription drugs there is a captive market (Joseph, 2003: 436). In the case of 
HIV the absence of real choice is particularly acute. Only a small array of possible treatments exists; the 
choices are limited and rest on affordability. Moreover, the consequences of treatment being withheld 
are stark. The patient wi ll di e from opportunistic infecti ons as a result of the syndrome if medication is 
not received. While, in a market-driven economy, ordi nary commodities are fungible (anyone of them 
can be substituted for any other similar commod ity, provided price and quality are the same) (Pe ll egrino, 
1999: 252), thi s is clearly not the case with med icines. Medicines have an inelastic demand. What the 
TRIPS Agreement effectively does is to further contract the already limited array of treatment opt ions 
avai lab le to HIV and AIDS patients. In terms of the TRIPS Agreement, the possibility of using generics 
is delayed for at least 15 years. 
Medication caters to human needs which are much more fundamental to human flourishing than 
any ord inary commodity (Pe llegrino, 1999: 25 1). In some cases its provision is a matter of life and 
death. Th is is why, unlike other industries, pharmaceutical companies rece ive di fferential treatment in 
the form of research funding, monopoly grants and tax breaks at the public's expense. 
Since 1996, as a result of research and development conducted by the pharmaceutical industry, a 
combination of anti ret rovira I or cocktail therapies has been available, and this has sign ificantl y 
prolonged the lives of those living with HIV and AIDS. These cocktail regimens not only de lay the 
emergence of drug resistance but also lead to a more prolonged benefit than indiv idual drugs (Consensus 
statement, 2006). As a result HIV and AIDS has changed from being an automati c death sentence to a 
manageable illness (Berger, 2006: 23). At the same time, access to ARV treatment is severely limited in 
developing countries where the major impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic has been experienced. 
While the reasons for lim ited access vary, inability to afford the drugs is a major factor. 
Even in the West, Joseph (2003: 428) argues, the price for ARV treatment is onl y sustai nable 
due to government subsidies and private health insurance- and this price, is determined by a sma ll group, 
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namely the world's major pharmaceutical companies. The only reason why such a small group has the 
power to decide what price to charge is because they have patents on these medicines. The 
pharmaceutical industry was one of the main lobbyists putting pressure on the US government to include 
lP protection of pharmaceuticals on the agenda during the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Furthermore, they continue to have the largest lobby in Washington and give abundantly to political 
campaigns, further increasing their power (Angell , 2004). The pharmaceutical industry claims that 
patents are necessary to cover R&D costs, to provide incentives and to promote technology transfer, so it 
is to these arguments that we now turn. 
One of the most widely appealed-to arguments, when justifying patents for intellectual property, 
is the utilitarian one based on providing incentives (Hettinger, 1989: 47). The gist of this argument is 
that patents provide the necessary incentive to produce new objects that are of value to society. "Patents 
operate on the assumption that people are not inherently altruistic, and expect rewards for their 
endeavors, especially when those endeavors are risky as they may and often do result in costly failure" 
(Joseph, 2003: 431). Ifno patent protection existed, it would be more convenient and less costly to copy 
other products and then sell them instead of spending unnecessary resources on R&D. This is because 
patents allow the inventor to sell, produce and di stribute the product for a limited period of time at a 
price and in a quantity they see fit. Patent rights are said to benefit users by making new and improved 
products available to them, which would not have been the case had no patent protection existed. 
It is estimated that a pharmaceutical company will not bring out a new drug unless a return of at 
least $1 billion can be guaranteed, because for every new drug that is brought out on the market there are 
at least ten which have failed and consequently have to be compensated for. According to a study 
conducted under DiMasi, it takes $800 million23 to develop a new drug (Cameron, 2005: 180). Money 
that is raised as a result of patent protection is needed to fund current, future and fai led R&D costs. The 
pharmaceutical industry operates in an environment where marginal costs are high and production costs 
are low. This accounts for the industry 's hostile attitude towards generic manufacturers. Generic 
producers only copy existing medication, and as a result do not have to invest any money in R&D. 
Similarly, a generic producer only has to prove that the generic drug is bioequivalent to its brand 
counterpart to be considered safe for human consumption. This eliminates the cost of expensive clinical 
trials that brand producers must bear. As a result, generics are sometimes 1000 times cheaper than their 
23 This estimate has been disputed and it is sai d to be more in the $400 million range; but because pharmaceutical companies 
refuse to make their budgets public, this cannot be validated (Angell , 2004). 
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brand counterparts. However, the existence of generics has served significantly to lower the price at 
which many medicines are offered by brand companies. Angell (2004) states that, when generics enter 
the market, the price usually falls to as little as 20 percent of what it initially was. To counter the threat 
of using generics as the norm rather than the exception, pharmaceutical companies argue that they will 
have less incentive to produce medicines for those markets where profit margins are low, because they 
will not be able to recuperate money spent on R&D (Berkman, 2002: 152). 
Another reason why patents are cited as necessary for the pharmaceutical industry is that they 
promote technology transfer that otherwise would not occur. In return for the monopoly grant, and in 
order for a patent to be considered, the product description or processes need to be disclosed. This 
means that others can view information which would previously have been unknown, thus assisting in 
future developments (Joseph, 2003: 431). Without patents, the different pharmaceutical companies 
would have to use and keep trade secrets which would lead essentially to the reinvention of the wheel. 
Trade secrets do not require disclosure, whereas patents do. They are protected for as long as they are 
held secret, while patents lapse after 20 years. Also trade secrets involve less cost than defending and 
acquiring a patent (Hettinger, 1989: 33). However, in the pharmaceutical industry it is particularly 
important that previous innovations are built on and improved in order to combat old and new diseases 
more effectively. Trade secrets prevent this, because information is not disclosed and thus much money 
has to be invested in creating the same medication before any advancement can be made24 
While apparently compelling, these arguments are undermined by the sheer magnitude of the 
profits in the pharmaceutical industry . The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most profitable in the 
world with an estimated net worth of $50 billion. In 2002 the combined profits ($35.9 billion) for the ten 
drug companies in the Fortune 500 were more than the profits for all the other 490 businesses put 
together ($33.7 billion) (Angell, 2004). While the cited reason for patent protection is to recoup R&D 
costs so that the incentive to innovate remains, expenditure on marketing is twice as much as that spent 
on R&D. Furthermore, much R&D is partially publicly funded - either directly by government or through 
universities. 
To sum up, the main argument advanced for patents is that they are supposed to encourage both 
technology transfer and innovation, although these are seemingly contradictory effects. In any case, 
recent trends in new drugs seem to show that drugs are being developed that are sim ilar to existing ones 
which are known to be profitable (Joseph, 2003: 434), so not much innovation is taking place. The 
24 This is obviously different for other commodities, such as Coca Cola which relies on trade secrets to stay in business. 
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majority of new drugs are not new but are, rather, variations of older drugs already on the market as 
companies attempt to acquire a share of an established lucrative market by producing a very similar 10P-
selling drug, known as a 'me-too ' drug (Angell, 2004). The R&D argument also does not seem to be a 
very strong one. 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has granted $287 million of five-year grants towards the 
development of an AIDS vaccine, on the condition that those who receive grants must first agree to 
share the results of their work (Chase, 2006). However, man y researchers turned down the grant because 
they either already had other funding, saw conflicting commercial commitments or felt uncertainty about 
the programme's impact on existing partnerships. As the vice pres ident of Wyeth Pharmaceuticals adds, 
there is already sufficient funding for their vaccine discovery programme and they will continue to 
operate their own independent research programme (Chase, 2006). Out of the 78 drugs approved by the 
Federal Drug Association (FDA) in 2002, 17 had new active ingredients and of these only seven were 
considered to be improvements on older or existing drugs (Angell, 2002). Why should a company invest 
in an uncertain endeavor when they can change part of an existing drug and get another twenty-year 
monopoly grant? 
Much research thus goes into so-called Western diseases such as cancer, heart disease and 
obesity, whereas most tropical di seases, found mainly in poorer Third World countries, lack new 
medicines for treatment. One way to lessen the focus on the development of medicines aimed mainly at 
the treatment of and cures for diseases that affect the wealthy and affluent parts of society, is to offer 
pharmaceutical companies tax reductions. This is currently only used for diseases that affect fewer than 
200 people, and the drugs developed for these diseases are called 'orphan drugs' . Furthermore, because 
the major pharmaceutical companies own most of the patents, this in itself provides little incentive for 
smaller firms to develop new drugs. Smaller firms, particular ly those in the developing and less 
developed world , are not able to recuperate costs on their new innovations because they have to pay 
patent royalties to the larger pharmaceutical companies who own most of the patents on medicinal 
products and processes. This leaves little incentive for smaller firms to innovate, and perpetuates the 
dependence on the large multinationals (Bell, 2006). 
Similarly, much R&D is put into drugs that deal with chronic ongoing conditions instead of 
investing in vaccines which do not have the same ongoing market (Joseph, 2003: 435). Clearly it is more 
in a pharmaceutical company's interest to develop a drug that requires regular intake (and thus yields a 
regular income) than one that requires a single dose. Interestingly enough, the major best-sellers of the 
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pharmaceutical industry are going to come off patent soon, thus theoretically making innovative R&D 
even more crucial to secure higher returns. 
The TRIPS Agreement says patent protection must be available for 20 years, and that protection 
must be included for both products and processes. Governments are only allowed to refuse a patent for 
an invention ifits commercial exploitation is prohibited/or reasons o/public order or morality and this 
can also include diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, plants and animals and the bio logical 
processes for producing them. This excludes microbiological plants and animals, however. Because of 
the patent term there is scope for uncompetitive prices and, because the pharmaceutical industry is 
cartelized2s, the problem of monopolies and high prices is worsened (Joseph, 2003: 428). In some cases 
patents are used to monopolize industries; for example, bigger pharmaceutical companies buy patents in 
order to suppress competit ion, and the power that this brings makes it almost impossible for new firms 
to enter the industry (Hettinger, 1989: SO). It is worth noting that there are only ten m1\ior players in the 
pharmaceutical industry, half of which are based in the US, while the rest are based in Britain, Sweden 
and France (Angell, 2004).There has also been a recent tendency for pharmaceutical companies to 
merge, leaving fewer but more powerful players . For example, in 1995 Glaxo bought Welcome for 
$14.3 billion and later merged with SmithKline and became known as GlaxoSmithKline (Gewertz and 
Amado, 2004: 307). 
Most patent systems adopt this utilitarian view, which , according to Maskus(2000: 28) can be 
summarized as follows: "IPRs strike a balance between the needs for invention and creation, on the one 
hand, and the needs for diffusion and access, on the other". And although the R&D incentive argument 
has its flaws, it also holds much weight. Consider the opposing public rights view, which asserts that it 
is inappropriate to assign private property rights to intellectual creations and that information belongs to 
the public domain (Maskus, 2000: 27). This would limit the incentive to create, because most people are 
not altruistic, but would definitely promote technology transfer. Conversely, the natural rights view, 
which exists independently of any thoughts about incentive or economic cost, states that failu re to assign 
ownership to someone's ideas constitutes theft and thus creators have a right to control any reworking of 
their ideas (Maskus, 2000: 27). This would limit technology transfer, because any diffusion of 
knowledge would rest on the goodwi ll of the patent holder, but would promote R&D because there 
would be financial incentive. The utilitarian argument thus strikes a balance between these arguments 
2S A cartel is a formal or infonnal agreement between a number of firms in an industry to restrict competition. Cartel 
agreements provide for a division of markets between firms in terms of their type of product (Black, 1997: 54), In this sense 
the pharmaceutical industry is the only one that can produce medicines. 
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and is used to justify protection offered by the state in the form of a patent. However these two 
utilitarian arguments for patents - incentive for R&D and technology transfer - have both been called 
into question. It may, however, be poss ible to defend patents on non-utilitarian grounds: to argue that 
people have a Lockean right to benefit from the ownersh ip of their private (inte ll ectual) property which 
cannot be undermined for the sake of social goals, however laudable. 
According to Locke, private property is the only thing that individuals do not surrender when 
they join together in a social contract to establish a common authority (Zelleke, 2003). Objects produced 
by an individual through the mixing of labour with resources are the property of that individual alone 
(Ostergard, 1999: 159). But Locke does add in two limitations in his theory of private property rights, 
which are known as the ' Lockean Provisos' . The first is that one is allowed to appropriate from what is 
owned in the common without consent if there "is enough, and as good left in common for others" and 
secondly, one should appropriate only as "much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life 
before it spoi ls" (Locke, 1988: 288). Thus when you mix your own labour with something from its 
natural state, yo u must leave enough and as good for others and must also ensure that you do not take 
more than you need. By mixing your labour with something from the 'common good' you add more 
value to the object than it wou ld have possessed had it been left as is. And it is precise ly because of this 
increase in value that individuals have an exclusive right to their own property (Gewertz & Amado, 
2004: 299). 
Ostergard argues that the question of ownership in the cumulative inventive process poses a 
serious problem (1999: 159) for a Lockean defense of intellectual property rights. New ideas are based 
on and built from other people 's ideas. In hi s theory of justice called the entitlement theory of justice, 
Robert Nozick has offered a contemporary defense of private property in a Lockean mode. Nozick 
interprets Locke 's first proviso "where there is enough, and as good left in common for others" to mean 
that the acquisition of property through labour is only legitimate if other people do not suffer any net 
harm thereby. In other words, no one must be left worse off than they al ready are as a result of the 
acquisition. In the case of patents, even though they limit access, thi s does not consti tute a violation of 
Locke's fi rst proviso because the invention would not have existed without the efforts of the inventor. 
As Locke pointed out, when you add your own labour to an object and thereby increase its value, at the 
same time you reduce the pressure on other resources because you are making them available for others 
(Wo lff, 1991 : 104). Nozick 's interpretation of Locke's proviso is that exc lusivity is onl y allowed if it 
does not worsen the position of others. 
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For Nozick. if acquisition and transfer are just, then whatever property distribution results is just. 
In the case of patented medicines, individuals who cannot afford to buy a medicine at a certain price will 
not be worse off than they were before without the medicine26 Those who profit from selling medicines 
at this price can therefore not be said to be acting unjustly. 
Nozick states that a monopoly grant, in which the inventor is permitted exclusively to produce 
and sell the product, is fundamental to an individual's right to his own ideas- but adds that it is essential 
that these rights are not permanent (Gewertz & Amado, 2004: 300). For example, the TRIPS Agreement 
fulfills thi s criterion by only allowing a (minimum27) 20 year monopoly grant. Nozick continues that 
monopoly grants are not exclusive for an infinite period of time, because the same ideas can be invented 
independent of each other. For example, an American virologist, Dr. Gallo, and a French virologist in 
Paris, Luc Montagnier, both independently discovered the AIDS virus which led to competing claims 
and a lawsuit by the French for credit and a share of patent loyalties from the HIV blood test (Chase, 
2006). According to Nozick, the time limit placed on patents should correspond with the time that it 
would take for an independent discovery to occur (1974: 182). The reason for thi s limitation is to ensure 
that a just acquisition of property ensues, and not because the patent worsens the conditions of others 
(Gewertz & Amado, 2004: 301). 
Nozick therefore emphasizes the importance of private property rights and, consequently, of the 
state's role in protecting these rights. The state provides this protection of IP rights in the form of 
patents. A patent prevents others from unjustly using an invention by giving the holder the exclusive 
right for a number of years to produce the good or use the process (Black, 1997: 344). As long as the 
acquisition of the patent- and the discovery of Ih~ innovation- has arisen from a previous just 
distribution, then entitlement is considered just. This means that any infringement of the patent by the 
state or otherwise is unjust, because the protection of IP is seen as the patent holder's basic right. There 
can be no justification for intervention or redistribution, because such an act will violate the individual 's 
right to benefit from the labour of their own ideas (Gewertz & Amado, 2004: 302). The state, then, has 
no moral obligation or justification for violating intellectual property rights in order to produce desirable 
social outcomes such as healthcare benefits for the poor. One cannot justify policy outcomes that result 
from a vio lation of the principles of justice. Significantly, Justice Edwin Cameron, a respected high 
court judge in South Africa, refused to break patent laws when members of the TAC decided to import 
26 However, as a result of not having access to ARV treatment, individuals will arguably be worse affas time passes because 
their condition will deteriorate without medication. 
27 In South Africa it is 20 years, while in the US it is 25 years. 
35 
cheaper generic life saving drugs illegally, even though these actions partly led to the government 
making ARVs available in the public sector (See Cameron, 2005, Chapter 7 for more detail). 
As we see, Nozick is concerned that the initial acquisition should be just: in other words, 
property should be acquired in accordance with recognized legal procedures rather than, say, stolen or 
acquired through deception. Because pharmaceutical companies file patents legitimately under the 
TRIPS Agreement and national legislation, they are the rightful owners of the medicine on patent and 
therefore are entitled to profit from their ownership. "Any distribution will be just as long as each 
possession was acquired either through a proper initial acquisition or through a just transfer" (Wellman, 
2002: 70). Even though it would be noble of a pharmaceutical company to reduce AR V treatment to a 
price that developing countries and LDCs can afford, Nozick argues that they have no moral obligation 
to do so. Therefore as long as a patent is held, justice requires that pharmaceutical companies are 
allowed to use the product as they see fit (Wellman, 2002: 68). 
Nozick stresses the separateness of persons, and argues that individuals have abso lute control 
over themse lves. It is for this reason that rights are inviolable: they can never be justly overridden 
(Wolff, 1991: 19). This libertarian theory of justice, focusing as it does on procedures for acquisition 
and transfer, is regarded as unsatisfactory by those who are discomforted by the highly unequal 
outcomes that such a theory allows. Furthermore, some argue that IPRs have less moral substance than 
forms of property rights, and that physical property cannot be equated with IP (Cameron & Geffen, 
2005: 168). When a globa l standard is applied to intellectual property, such as occurs with the TRIPS 
Agreement, inequalities are worsened. Denying medication to the poor, who are more likely to get sick, 
further exacerbates the problem. The libertarian view thus implicitly reiterates the notion that the poor 
are undeserving (Cameron & Geffen, 2005: 197). Moreover, globalization accelerates the pace at which 
inequalities have been widened28 Globalization has also forced international law and institutions to 
acknowledge the emergence of MNCs as human rights vio lators, thus recognizing that companies also 
have human rights obligations (Ferreira, 2003: (159). Ferreira (2003: (163) points out that the UN 
passed a resolution stating that a lack of ARVs limits the realization ofa right to health, and thus, 
however justly acquired, if an outcome results in a human rights abuse, surely this still constitutes a 
human rights abuse? This perhaps convincingly shows that outcome does indeed matter. 
John Rawls (2003: 5) offers a different account of distributive justice which attempts to argue for 
ajust outcome. Rawls' theory of justice rests on what he calls ' fundamenta l intuitive ideas' because he 
28 See Pogge for a more detailed description on the effects of globalization and the idea of global justice. 
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believes that these ideas can be agreed upon by different people with different conceptions ofjustice29 
Those ideas that we use to organize and to give structure to justice as fairness as a whole is what Rawls 
says count as fundamental ideas. These are: 
1. The idea of society as a fair system of social co-operation over time from one 
generation to the next 
2. The idea of citizens (those engaged in co-operation) as free and equal persons 
3. And the idea of a well-ordered society, one where a society is effectively regulated by 
a public conception of justice (Rawls, 2003: 5). 
Justice as fairness takes the primary subject of political justice to be the basic structure of society; that 
is, the structure of soc iety comprises its main political and social institutions and how they fit together 
into one unifi ed system of co-operation (Rawls, 2003: 40). It is the basic structure of society which has 
an influence on people's life prospects; how well someone fares in life depends in part on their place in 
the basic structure and on the way that it is regulated (Brighouse, 2004: 37). For example, the poor are 
more deeply affected by HIV and AIDS because of their initial position in society and their inability to 
afford ARVs. 
Rawls famously begins with the hypothetical ' contract of the original position'. He uses this idea 
to illustrate what restrictions on the principles of justice rational beings wou ld agree to . We enter society 
by birth and only leave by death ; thus society is not entered by choice. Furthermore, the basic structure 
influences other chosen contracts by influencing the principles of justice (Brighouse, 2004: 39). The 
original position then models two things: the first sets up the fair conditions under which we would 
agree the basic structure should be regulated, and the second st ipulates acceptable restrictions on the 
reasons for putting forward certain principles of justice and rejecting others (Rawls, 2003: 80). But what 
wou ld ensure that no one would set up principles that would be only advantageous to them? Rawls 
introduces the idea of a 'vei l of ignorance '. This veil of ignorance ensures that no individual is aware of 
their own or others' talents and positions in society. It also ensures that the principles are impartial 
(Brighouse, 2004: 40). And because of this ignorance, all parties involved would want resources to be 
distributed so that the least advantaged in society wou ld benefit because they may fall into the least 
29 Unlike Nozick's argument which appeals to the libertarians. 
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advantaged categoryJO (Wellman, 2002: 67). In other words, the original position would make all of us, 
Rawls contends, "risk minimisers" . 
Who then counts as the least advantaged in society, and how does one ensure that the least 
advantaged are benefited? Rawls describes what he calls a 'thin theory of the good' wh ich is "a theory 
of primary goods, which are the goods that people would have reason to care about having regardless of 
whatever else they have reason to care about" (Brighouse, 2004: 44) . Primary goods are divided into 
three categories, namely: natural primary goods, social primary goods and se lf respect. The first, natural 
primary goods, are things such as health, intelligence, body parts, talent, etc. and are not available for 
di stribution. Social primary goods can be distributed, and self respect depends on the distribution of 
social goods but is not itself distributed (Brighouse, 2004: 45). 
Rawls uses two principles of justice that govern the assignment of rights and regulates 
distribution of social primary goods: the liberty principle and the difference principle. The first, the 
liberty principle, states that "each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for a ll " (Rawls, 
2003: 42). This means that we all have equal rights to basic liberties such as the right to health and 
freedom of speech. The second principle is twofold. Rawls states that social and economic inequalities 
are only permissible if they satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under cond itions of fair equality of opportunity; second, they are to be to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged members of society (2003: 43) . The first part implies that each person should be 
able to compete on an even playing field, or that each person shou ld have fair equality of opportunity 
(Wellman, 2002: 66). The second part, known as the ' difference principle ', claims that social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged or worst-off members of society. In order for any inequality to be justified, it must benefit 
the least advantaged person in society (Gewertz & Amado, 2004: 302). 
Patents are there to reward invention and promote technology transfer. The case of ARV 
provision illustrates that, as a result of this patent protection, many cannot afford the necessary 
treatment. Thus the least advantaged people in society do not only not benefit, but, because HIV and 
AIDS is left to run rampant in their bodies, they are further harmed. It is important to note that the first 
principle trumps the second. For example, I cannot infringe on someone's right to health by offering 
30 Although hypothetically this may be sound, once people are in their various positions in society, many do not feel that they 
are compelled to help the poor; it is not a matter of duty but rather of charity. 
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them a large sum of money in return for violating their basic liberty: financial or any other compensation 
would not be satisfactory, according to Rawls. In other words, the principles are ordered in lexical 
priority. 
Here it is important to observe the characteristics of basic rights or liberties. Buchanan (1984: 
56) cites four: firstly a basic right is entitled and owned; secondly it must be protected and failure to do 
so is an injustice; thirdly a basic right cannot be infringed upon because doing so would maximize 
overall utility; and finally a right applies to all humans regardless of race, gender, class or geographical 
location. From this it is clear that the right to health is an absolute right, whereas the right to intellectual 
property is not. MNCs are so powerful that, according to Ferreira (2003: 1160) they have become 
"organs of society" and , like individuals who enjoy certain rights, so do they. As Shiva argues, MNCs 
have thus naturalized IP as a right and in doing so have placed IPRs on par with fundamental human 
rights3 !. But even though intellectual property is a right, it is not a basic liberty in the Rawlsian sense of 
the term (Gewertz & Amado, 2004: 302). Furthermore because IP is not a liberty it is then not protected 
by the second principle. It is not protected from redistribution. Redistribution is only permitted if the 
action will create a more just situation, and it is the function of the state to provide (re)distribution 
(Gewertz & Amado, 2004: 303). For example, the state already does this in the form of taxes. But 
further redistribution is justified for two reasons: firstly because of the right to IP conflicts with an 
individual's right to health in light of the HIV and AIDS epidemic and, secondly, because redistribution 
of ARVs will create a more just situation. 
Although this course of action would alleviate many of the immediate problems associated with 
the epidemic, such as less pressure being put on the public health system (because more people on 
ARVs means less people suffer from opportunistic infections), further repercussions (outcomes) need to 
be considered. As already stated, incentive is needed to develop new drugs, but nothing justifies the 
current excessive level of patent protection that the TRIPS Agreement outlines (Cameron & Geffen, 
2005: 170). However, pharmaceutical companies insist that the current level of patent protection is 
essential to cover costs. Yet not only is the pharmaceutical industry one of the most profitable in the 
world overall, but percentage net profit is also high. For example in 2004 Pfizer, Merck, GSK and 
Roche all had profit margins of over 20 percent (Davidson & Greblov, 2005). If the state readily issued a 
compulsory license to begin the manufacture of on-patent ARVs, in the future companies will be 
reluctant to invest in drugs that cater for predominantly non-Western diseases, because the threat of not 
31 Even though MNes receive these benefits it is not obligatory to return them, only commendable. 
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covering costs or securing returns would be constant. This would serve further to reduce the nominal 
research that does go into Third World diseases. 
Ten of the top 15 pharmaceutical companies reside in the US and, as illustrated when the South 
African government was forced to take on the PMA, they were not only taking on corporate America but 
also the US government. South Africa is currently seen as the face of Africa and, according to Bond 
(2007), president Mbeki is seen as the George Bush of Africa, showing that South Africa is a country the 
US can work with. This poses challenges. Firstly, the US was one of the main advocates ofIPRs and, 
not surprisingly, it is also one of the main beneficiaries thereof. If the South African government were to 
declare HIV and AIDS a national emergency, this would seriously undermine US confidence in the 
ability of the patent system to secure high returns. It would also expose the high prices of brand ARV 
medicines and this could cause public outrage in the US, where almost as much as 50 percent of the top 
15 drug companies' medicines are bought (Davidson & Greblov, 2005). Furthermore "the growing 
inequality in poor countries under the context of neo-liberalism increases the market share for more 
expensive patent-based drugs among the wealthy" (Katz, 2003). Secondly, as the US has stated many 
times before, a country is either on their side or not- and if South Africa did issue compulsory licenses or 
used any other means necessary to distribute ARVs cheaply, the government ri sks losing the backing of 
the USl2 
In light of all of this, the next chapter sets out to examine what the South African government's 
response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic has been, and what factors (domestic and international) have 
constrained action. 
3Z Previous actions of placing South Africa on their special watch list despite being TRIPS compliant support this . 
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4. "AIDS could have a more devastating effect on South Africa than 
apartheid". 
Health and well being are not individual concerns: they are global issues (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 
374). The HIV and AIDS epidemic "may be the epidemic that enables us to respond to the need for a 
common global public health. The epidemic makes us think how to bend global forces to provide more 
' goods ' for more human beings and in areas beyond what is usually thought of as health" (Barnett & 
Whiteside, 2006: 374). Many believe that it is the pharmaceutical companies ' responsibility to lower 
prices and make medication more accessible to poorer countries, whereas others believe that 
pharmaceutical companies should work closely with NGOs and governments . The government thus 
faces conflict with big business over who is to pay for ARVs, with all sides having an incentive to 
persuade others to shoulder costs (Bond, 2002). Ultimately, however, it is the role of the state to protect 
the rights of its citizens. As Toby Kasper (2001: 14) comments: " it is clear that having flexible laws in 
place only leads to improved access to medicine if they are greeted by a government that is willing to 
act". For instance, under the Doha Declaration the South African government has a right to declare HIV 
and AIDS a national emergency and gain access to more affordable treatment as a result. But despite 
having ten percent of its population living with HIV and AIDS, the South African government has yet to 
declare a national emergency. Much criticism has been directed at the South African government 
regarding its approach to HIV and AIDS. However, government policy arises in the context of both 
external and internal inhibiting factors, and these factors are all connected in a symbiotic relationship. 
Both external and internal factors play out in the context of the current global economic institutional 
order, i.e. capitalism accelerated and powered by globalization. 
Scholte (1997) argues that the state has altered its constituency in the face of globalization, and 
surrendered most of its sovereignty to forms of global governance that have, as a result, had bad effects 
for distributive justice. For example, South Africa had to adopt TRIPS in order to become a WTO 
signatory, which meant that national legislation had to be changed accordingly. The WTO and other 
intergovernmental regulatory frameworks , such as the IMF and the World Bank, illustrate global 
governance on a suprastate level. This top down approach detracts from a state's sovere ignty, but 
another form of global governance known as ' marketized global governance ' has the most influence on 
the state and emanates from the private sector. Examples inc lude think tanks, foundations , supervisory 
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agencies and advisory councils (Scholte, 1997: 26), and corporations. Under marketized global 
governance, markets step in where states and global governance agencies have left gaps. At the same 
time, the construction and implementation of rules imposed by the private sector are rarely effectively 
regulated or challenged (Scholte, 1997: 24) . The main beneficiaries of marketized governance are 
corporations. It is not surpri sing, then, as Anderson and Cavanagh (in Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 397) 
observe, that, of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations and only 49 are countries 
and that the top 200 Corporations ' combined sales are bigger than the combined economies of all 
countries minus the biggest ten. This illustrates the power that corporations have and, more importantly, 
shows the power that pharmaceutical companies - as some of the largest of these corporations - have. 
The pharmaceutical industry 's campaign contributions and lobbying expenses in the US are 
second only to the insurance industry's (The New York Times, 28 March 2006) and, during the Uruguay 
GA IT negotiations, the pharmaceutical industry put immense pressure on the US government to include 
IPRs in the discussion. In the recent documentary The Corporation (2005,) it is argued that corporations 
have displaced politicians and politics by the mere fact that they have gone global. Governments simply 
cannot control them. We therefore have a situation where industry and government are working 
together, and in this case it is the pharmaceutical industry and the US government. However, a 
separation has to be made between the institution and the individual. In the same documentary, Noam 
Chomsky illustrates this with an example of slavery and the slave owner. He states that the slave owner 
might be a charismatic person and may treat the slave well, but the slave owner is in no way responsible 
for pioneering slavery. In the same way the institution, in this case capitalism, which benefits and 
ensures the pharmaceutical industry's survival, has to be distinguished from the pharmaceutical 
companies ' CEOs or employees. 
Globalization is accelerated by capitalism, and pharmaceutical companies operate within a 
neoliberal capitalist framework. This means that the pursuit of profit is endemic to capitalism; it would 
not be capitalism if it did not do that (Nielsen, 2005: 191). This is the environment in which 
pharmaceutical companies find themselves operating. Similarly, South Africa also operates within this 
neo liberal capitalist framework and thus has to succumb to its various demands. But unlike 
pharmaceutical companies, whose main aim is to promote and protect IPRs in order to create research 
incentives and thus secure higher returns, South Africa has different domestic issues that complicate its 
response to protecting IPRs as well as the right to health. As Barnett and Whiteside (2006: 381) 
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comment, it seems that today the function of the state is to explain why it is not possible to do things that 
citizens may wish to have done on their behalf. 
The state has been the traditional human rights duty-bearer (Joseph , 2003: 438), and it is thus not 
surprising that, according to a recent survey)), citizens in a democracy expect the government to deliver 
all of their basic needs including health care. HIV and AIDS places increasing burdens on already 
strained health care systems. A government can only use resources that are available to it, and reali zing 
each citizen's right to health can be taxing due to factors such as poverty and inequality. South Africa is 
a middle-income country with a population of 44 million and is not dependent on donor aid for its social 
services (Schneider & Stein, 2001: 724). The South African government has been able to fund 
educational health programmes, such as Love Life and Khomonani as well as free condom and femidom 
distribution. Yet South Africa remains the most unequal country in the world with a Gini score)4 of 
about 0.6, and has the second highest number of people living with HIV and AIDS. It is also then not 
surprising that HIV and AIDS prevalence is highest among those living in poverty. 
The first AIDS cases in South Africa were reported in 1983, and at first the epidemic had its 
greatest impact among minority groups such as intravenous drug users, prostitutes and gay men (Walker 
et ai, 2004: 12). The origins of HIV are surrounded by controversy because of what is implied about the 
epidemic. Different accounts have different implications. What is certain is that Africa, particularly Sub-
Saharan Africa, now deals with the bulk of the epidemic. As South African President Thabo Mbeki 
asked: why has Africa had the world's most terrible HIV and AIDS epidemic (Jllife, 2006: 58)? It is 
important to note that, as with Chomsky's distinction between the institution and the individual , a 
similar distinction can be made between the HIV and AIDS epidemic and the individual who is HIV 
positive or living with AIDS. An epidemic has what Barnett and Whiteside call ' impact ' and, even 
though the government will be assisting individuals, it is crucial that HIV and AIDS policies are directed 
at the epidemic and not just at the individual or the disease. 
Epidemics are in no way new to South Africa. In the 20th century hundreds of thousands of 
people died of smallpox, Spanish flu , TB and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). However, what is 
different about the AIDS epidemic is that, firstly, the illness develops very slowly with few apparent 
symptoms and, secondly, there is no vaccine or cure available (Walker et ai, 2004: 61). These factors 
differentiate the AIDS epidemic from any other epidemics that South Africa - and the world at large -
)J See www.afrobarometer.org 
)4 The Gin; coefficient varies between 0 and I ~ the closer to 1. the more unequal a society; the closer to 0, the more equal a 
society. For a more detailed exp lanation visit < http: //www.warmafrica.com/index/geo/5/catll /a/alarl id/557>. 
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has had to face before. A short history of the HIV and AIDS epidemic in South Africa will reveal the 
factors that gave HIV and AIDS, the disease, epidemic status and will also illuminate the responses to 
the epidemic that served to develop the HIV and AIDS policy agenda. 
In the 1930s and 1940s South Africa experienced a venereal syphili s epidemic)5. Dr Kark, 
observing the epidemic, said: "without an understanding of the economic factors involved and the 
hi storical factors of the vast social pathological changes brought about during the last seventy years, no 
treatment will save the spread of syphilis in South Africa" (in Walker et ai, 2004: 62). One of these 
factors was human migrancy. Un like other industrializing countries, that used migrant labour only when 
in economic transition, South Africa used migrant labour as a continuous source of cheap labour in 
many industries but particularly in the mining industry (Walker et ai, 2004: 62). South Africa was also 
governed along racial lines, with the 'white' minority controlling the ' black ' majority. [n 1948, under 
white minority government, migrant labour was formalized and legislated)6 The so called infamous pass 
laws (infl ux control legislation) were imposed, and the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 had already seen 
black people restricted to overpopulated rural areas except where their labour was needed in the urban 
economy (Schoeman, 200 I: 323). The new job opportunities in the cities led to an increase in , at first , 
predominantly male (in the mining industry), then female labour (as domestic workers) in urban areas 
(urban ization) . This served to unsettle and destabilize rural communities as we ll as di srupt social 
relations. In addition, labour migration contributed to the further impoverishment of rural areas in 
relation to urban areas)7 (Schoeman, 200 I: 325). The preconditions for an epidemic, however, were 
already in place. The di sruption offamily life and both rural and urban overcrowding created by 
apartheid legislation set the stage for any sexually transmitted disease to reach epidemic proportions. 
South Africa was wide open to HIV and AIDS. 
During the late 1980s South Africa was already witnessing the demise of apartheid. The then 
president, P.W. Botha, declared two unsuccessful states of emergency to try to control the breakdown of 
order. In 1985 the Government set up the country's first AIDS Advisory Group in response to the 
increas ingly apparent presence of HIV amongst South Africans (Avert, 2006) . While apartheid still 
ruled, if diseases broke out in 'non-white' areas, and it appeared as though the outbreak would affect 
35 Venereal syphi lis was not differentiated from endemic syphilis, which was a pre-existing disease, but it was venereal 
syphilis that spread to epidem ic proportions (Walker et ai , 2004: 67). 
36 The term lapartheid ' was only coined in the 19505, and the government was only 'apartheid' after the laws of the period 
had been passed. 
37 Much later, legislation was even passed which allowed HIV testing of foreign workers entering the country and, if found 
positive, they were prevented from entering and working in South Africa (Head, 1993: 25). 
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'white ' areas, it was assumed that the diseases would be controlled (Walker et ai , 2004: 73). Shockingly, 
during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) it was revealed that HIV had been used as a 
weapon by the 'white ' minority agai nst the ' black ' majority (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 166), further 
serving to racialize the di sease. The year 1986 saw the collapse of the pass laws, but instead of 
improving living conditions, the effect was to increase the number of shack and informal sett lements, 
particularly around urban areas (Walker et ai, 2004: 83). It was these conditions that favoured even more 
the spread of STls38 and made it clear that HIV and AIDS would no longer be an epidemic confined to 
the marginali zed, but that it would become a heterosexual epidemic. 
Apartheid policies were engineered to benefit the white minority at the expense of and to the 
detriment of black majorities, as well as Indian and co loured populations. By the 1980s it became clear 
that a system based on 'separate but equal' policies - the polite face of apartheid - would no longer be 
sustainable, and talks with the aim of transforming South Africa into a democracy began. Many political 
leaders were returning from exile, and had witnessed at first hand what the epidemic could do . Speaking 
at an AIDS conference in Maputo, in 1990, Chris Hani showed that he knew this all too well: "We 
cannot afford to allow the AIDS epidemic to ruin the realization of our dreams" (in Marais, 2000: 4). In 
1991 the Health Secretariat of the African National Congress (ANC) began di scussions about possib le 
actions around AIDS with the Department of Health , and in October of the following year, the two 
jointly hosted a conference on AIDS in South Africa (Schneider & Stein, 200 I: 725). As a result of the 
conference, which brought together the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the National 
Party government's ministry of health , the National AIDS Committee of South Africa (NACOSA) was 
founded, to develop a national strategy to deal with HIV and AIDS. The goals of this plan were to (a) 
prevent HIV transmission, (b) reduce the persona l and social impact of HI V infection, and (c) mobilize 
and unify provincial, international and local resources (HIVIAIDSISTD Strategic Planfor South Africa 
2000-2005, 2000). The AIDS plan was drawn up at a time when the National Bill of Rights was being 
formulated and debates around human rights were at their height (Schneider & Stein, 2001: 725). Many 
gay rights advocacy organizations, trade unions, NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs) 
were already working together to combat HIV and AIDS, and reali zed that any successful preventative 
and treatment programmes had to be situated within their broader social context. The struggle for a 
humane policy on HIV and AIDS thus informed the debate on and the struggle for constitutional rights 
(Head, 1993: 25) . Furthermore, the government also had to admit that, in order to initiate a successful 
38 If a person has an STI then they become more susceptible to contracting the HI vi rus. 
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and comprehensive national HIV and AIDS programme, it had to work with NGOs and unions. 
NACO SA thus represented "a coord inated national effort that straddled political differences and 
included the major political players of the time" (Walker et ai, 2004: 86). 
In 1994 the new government immediately adopted the National AIDS Plan and declared it a 
Presidential Lead Project, which gave the AIDS programme special status and earl y access to resources 
(Schneider & Stein, 2001: 725). Significantly, the plan did not view the epidemic so lely as a medical 
issue but also as an economic, political and social issue that permeated all aspects of society. The AIDS 
programme would thus offer a multisectoral response to combat effectively HIV and AIDS. At first 
there was tremendous support for the AIDS plan. The then minister of health , Dr Zuma, used the plan as 
the national framework for action; a programme director was appo inted; and the AIDS budget was 
doubled (Marai s, 2000: 13). However, the need for a smooth democratic transition overshadowed the 
need for a HIV and AIDS programme. Simi larly, conservatism and the fear of talking about sex also 
contributed, as then President Mandela admitted: "I wanted to win and I didn ' t talk about AIDS" 
(Heywood, 2004) Thus, against NACOSA's recommendation, the HIV and AIDS plan was placed 
within a transforming health sector. This meant that the "power over AIDS policymaking was in fact 
concentrated in the Department of Health and the Treasury, and later the Presidency, rather than in 
Cabinet" (Butler, 2005: 600). The raison d'elre was that HIV and AIDS could be dea lt with more 
effectively in the health sector because then there wou ld be no competing interests, as would be if it 
were placed across sectors. Because health is in part a provincial prerogative, AIDS was then vu lnerable 
to further admin istrative obstruction, since many people from the old civil serv ice were used to staff the 
new civi l service and the provincial departments were unable to accommodate the requ ired in ter-sectora l 
cha llenges posed by HIV and AIDS (Butler, 2005: 593,600). Indeed, as Schneider & Ste in (2001: 726) 
note, one of the "ongo ing difficulties experienced by the government AIDS in frastructure was in 
defining responsibilit ies and coordinating actions between spheres of government". 
The new democratic government inherited a system that was meant to be authoritarian and was 
also corrupt. The new South Africa thus had to be built using a highly inefficient system which severely 
constrained and restricted what cou ld and could not be achieved. The fundamental flaw of the AIDS 
plan was that it over estimated the implementation capacity of the new government during the transition 
period (Schneider & Stein, 200 I : 726), and this served to deepen the tribulations. Moreover, although 
the financial commitment to the AIDS plan was weak, the fa ilure to implement the plan cannot be linked 
directly to government funding (Marais, 2000: 26). Many government departments had problems with 
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spending the large budget allocations . For example, in 1995/6 only 51 percent of the total budget was 
spent, and this increased to 88 percent the following year, still leaving RIO million unspent (Schneider 
& Stein, 200 I: 727). 
Similarly, donors were discouraged from donating funds directly to NGOs but were encouraged 
rather to give any donations directly to the health department, which would then redistribute the fund s. 
Yet centra l to any successfu l HIV and AIDS plan is that it needs to function at a grass roots level. 
Although NGOs and CBOs function in this way, the government's actions severed any strong ties that 
they had formed with civil society prior to 1994. This can be attributed partly to the belief that 
transformation lies, not with civil society and the state, but so lely with the state. Despite this, the most 
cited exp lanation for the failure to implement the AIDS plan and for general inaction towards HIV and 
AIDS from the government is lack of political will. But, as will be shown, this is often used as a politica l 
scapegoat. 
Marais argues that political will is an essential factor but by itself insufficient (2000: 28). 
Hindsight shows that projects ini tiated at presidential leve l are not necessarily successful. For example, 
take the failure of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the 'presidential lead' 
projects (Schneider & Stein, 2001: 726). Furthermore, commitment at national leve l would not 
guarantee that an initiative would filter down to provincial or municipal level (Marais, 2000: 29). 
Calling for more political commitment in a climate that is rampant with HIV and AIDS, although 
essentia l, has led to what Schneider & Stein (200 1 :727) describe as "searching for short term solutions". 
Scandal after scandal has erupted; these have not only questioned the government's commitment to 
combating the epidemic in South Africa but have also undermined any progress that has been made. 
In 1996 a contract for RI4 million was signed to produce the musical Sarafina II, intended to 
educate scholars about HIV and AIDS. This generated an enormous amount of negative press, and was 
the first subject to be investigated by the new office of the Public Protector (Walker et ai, 2004: 87). As 
a result of the report, the contract was terminated and the show aborted. The uproar was not so much 
about the money (representing a cost of R2-R3 for every pupil who saw the show), but rather about the 
complete disregard for bureaucratic procedures (Marais, 2000: 33). Firstly the contract was not tendered 
for, and secondly the effectiveness of the play was questioned. 
As the scandal behind Sarafina II started to die down, in February 1997 the South African 
government backed several domestically developed but ineffective AIDS drugs (Kremer, 2000: 73). The 
Medical Research Council denied applications for further testing on humans due to the drugs' toxicity 
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and questionable effectiveness (Walker et ai, 2004: 87). It was revealed that Virodene (an organic 
solvent) had not even passed the most basic animal and biological testing (Schneider & Stein, 200 I: 
728). Despite these warnings, the government tried to speed up the release of Virodene, which breaches 
both ethical and procedural guidelines for releasing any new medication, not only in South Africa but 
also the world (Marais, 2000: 34). 
In August of the same year, the Minister of Health announced that AIDS (not HIV) would be 
made notifiable. This was in stark contrast to the 1997 National Review and to the AIDS plan that 
worked within a human rights framework, so that both valued confidentiality (Marais, 2000: 42-3). 
According to Cameron "stigma - a social brand that marks di sgrace, humiliation , and rejection - remains 
the most ineluctable, indefinable, intractable problem in the epidemic" (2005: 53). Dr luma reasoned 
that by making AIDS notifiable, stigma would lessen as a result. Various bodies proposed more efficient 
and less problematic methods, and these proposals were put to the Minister through the A IDS Advisory 
Committee (AAC) - which was terminated shortly after it commenced, with a response still pending 
(Schneider & Stein, 2001: 728). 
In 1998 and 1999 the scandal continued when the government questioned the safety, feasibi lity 
and practica lity of Azidothymidine (AlT). In 1998 the government withheld funding supposedly due to 
budget constraints. In response the TAC was formed, and it was found that the reasons cited for denying 
AlT were unjustified. aSK, the patent owner of AZT, had lowered the price by 70 percent (Mairais, 
2000: 40). Then in October 1999 President Mbeki said AZT was toxic and dangerous, and in November 
of that year the newly appointed health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, said that tests showed that 
mice given AlT developed cancer (Marais, 2000: 40). At this time the PMA took the South African 
government to court when it tried to provide cheaper ARV treatment to its citizens by manufacturing 
generic drugs locally, clearly allowed by a clause in the TRIPS Agreement. The case was dropped by the 
PMA in 2001, which settled out of court in favour of the South African government. It is important to 
realize that the South African government would not have won the court case so easily and quickly 
without global mobilization. The victory seemed to illustrate support from the government for providing 
ARV treatment, but in 2000 President Mbeki shocked the world by announcing plans to the contrary. 
The National AIDS Committee (SANAC) was launched but it excluded scientists and activists 
and consisted mostl y of so called ' AIDS di ss idents', i.e. those who held controversial views on the 
epidemic. The President's spokesperson, Parks Mankahlana announced that the panel would answer 
questions that included whether or not AIDS exists, what it is, and what the causes are (Cameron, 2005: 
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106). One such dissident on the panel, US-based David Rasnick, claimed that "they [Africans] are not 
suffering and dying from something new called AIDS", adding that AIDS was caused by recreational 
drug use, ARVs and poverty (Mail & Guardian, 9 April 2001). At the 13 th international AIDS 
conference held in Durban later that year, the world anxiously awaited for clarification. Pres ident Mbeki 
openly questioned the causes of AIDS. In an interview with Time magazine, when asked about hi s 
dissident views, he replied: "No, 1 am saying that you cannot attribute immune deficiency solely and 
exclusively to a virus" and maintained that factors such as poverty, poor nutrition, contaminated water 
and other diseases were to blame (Mail & Guardian, 11 September 2000). The socio-economic causes 
of HI V and AIDS were investigated and not the viral causes (Butler, 2005: 594). In response to thi s, 
5000 researchers and scientists world wide issued a 'Durban Declaration,39 stating that HIV causes 
AIDS, full stop (Schechter, 2000). Similarly there was a call for treatment to be made available in 
resource poor settings (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 366). Schechter (2000), who often reports on Mbeki 
and regards him highl y, said that President Mbeki questioning the cause of AIDS reminded him of when 
P W Botha was supposed to end apartheid in 1989 with his 'cross ing of the Rubicon ' address; "Botha 
blew it then too , refusing to satisfy world opinion". 
Although Mbeki never directly sa id HIV does not cause AIDS, and much can be said about 
factors such as poverty that may indeed increase the ri sk of HIV infection, 
The fact that the president flilted with, or even bought into , the dissident position on HIV and 
AIDS, is his business and his business alone. The fact that he left the marks of his lapse of 
good judgment not only on AIDS policy but on the reputation of South Africa affects us all (Mail 
& Guardian, 9 June 2000). 
Departing from the scientific medical norm, as is the case in South Africa, widens existing problems and 
causes new ones. At first the South African government would not suppl y Nevirapine to pregnant HIV 
positive mothers, citing as reason that the drug was toxic. Yet Nevirapine prevents mother-to-child HIV 
transmission. This is made worse by the fact that many 'doctors ' like Mathias Rath claim to have 
invented a cure for AIDS which many believe to be true, partly due to President Mbeki's failure to 
denounce such ' cures'. Rath promoted vitamins as a substitute for ARVs. The TAC filed a lawsuit 
against the Medicines Control Council (MCC) because it failed to take any action against Rath 's illegal 
activities, which it is obliged to do (Meerkotter et ai, 2006: 13). Despite of all these goings-on, however, 
condoms were still distributed, public health awareness campaigns were sponsored and medicines to 
39 See www.durbandeclaralion.org 
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treat STIs were purchased (Walker et ai, 2004: 125). Such reactions by the South African government40 
(as well as some independent constituencies) breed uncertainty and undermine public confidence with 
regard to the effectiveness of ARV treatment, and arguably worsen the epidemic. 
These factors serve to intensify the division between the state on the one hand , and scientists, 
along with those in favour of treatment, on the other (Mail & Guardian, 8 August 2003). Butler 
proposes that post-apartheid HIV and AIDS policy making in South Africa fall s within two paradigms: 
the first is a "nationalist/ameliorative paradigm that focused on poverty, palliative care, traditional 
medicine, and appropriate nutrition", and the second is a "mobilization/biomedical paradigm that 
emphasized societal mobilization, political leadership and antiretroviral treatment" (2005: 591). 
Although Butler concludes that the ANC accommodates proponents of each paradigm and that the 
dangers ofa faulty ARV programme best explain the government's continued adherence to a cautious 
prevention and treatment policy4l, this thesis argues that there are other factors at play that prevent the 
successful implementation of an HIV and AIDS programme. 
Firstly, why would someone deny the link between HIV and AIDS? As Mbeki put it: "the 
problem is that once you say immune deficiency is acquired from that virus your response will be 
antiretroviral drugs" (Mail & Guardian, II September 2000). In 200 I the use of ARVs in the public 
sector was rejected by the Minister of Health despite reports from the Medical Research Council and 
World Health Organization (WHO), which support the use of ARVs. These reports arise from the 
premise that HIV causes AIDS (Mail & Guardian, 10 March 2003). Furthermore, the mortality statistics 
released with regard to HIV and AIDS were questioned by the president: " I think we should wait for the 
work of the scientists about this because that is precisely the question they are rai sing, these scientists-
How are these figures arrived at" (Mail & Guardian, 23 March 2003). 
Mbali (2004: 104) argues that denialism42 in South Africa can be understood to be driven by five 
factors. The first comprises the medical findings of dissident scientists, the second is the extent of the 
epidemic, the third is a strategy to avoid conflict over IPRs, the fourth a way to allow the government to 
continue adopting poverty-sustaining neo liberal policies, and the fina l factor is the idea that the 
'African ' is inherently a diseased racial and sexual 'other '. It is important to see that all of the above 
factors are linked and cannot be viewed in iso lation. 
40 The South African government is not united in its responses to HIV and AIDS. There has been much criticism from both 
inside and outside of the ANC. 
41 Butler refutes the idea that denialism can explain the government's actions. 
42 Denialism refers to the set of dissident views regarding HIV and AIDS . 
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If the government believes that ARVs are toxic, then there appears to be no reason to confront 
the powerful pharmaceutical industry and the constituencies that strongly support them - i.e. the US 
government, - for cheaper or generic drugs (Mbali, 2004: 108). In the year 2000 the HIV and AIDS/STD 
Strategic Plan/or South A/rica 2000-2005 was launched, and showed promise because of its multi-
sectoral approach. However, even though the plan was based on a template provided by the United 
Nations (UN), " it lacked concrete commitments and timeframes, and created controversy by evading 
analysis of ARV options" (Butler, 2005: 595). Strangely enough, in August 2003 the government did 
announce a national publ ic AR V roll-out programme, even though they had not denounced their 
di ss ident stance on the use of ARVs. This position was adopted, follo wing protests by the T AC, and it 
was suggested that there would be 53000 people on treatment by April 200443 (Barnett & Whiteside, 
2006: 366). This includes providing ARV treatment to rape survivors, pregnant women and to those 
w ith a CD4 count of 200 or less44• 
It must be reiterated that ARV administration is a complex process, and more importantly, 
requires good nutrition as well as a strong public health service infrastructure to be effective. The 
Department of Health has acknowledged the importance of nutrition repeatedly, but has thus far fail ed to 
place the value of proper nutrit ion in context. Granted that good nutrition has been proven to be essential 
for the effective use of ARV treatment, this is only one piece of the multi-dimensional puzzle. The 
South African government has reiterated that poverty is a bigger problem than HIV and AIDS and 
consequently needs to have priority over it. Indeed, as Chomsky adds: "I think there would be general 
agreement among specialists that he [MbekiJ is right in pointing out that hunger is a much worse killer 
than AIDS, and that hunger and other consequences of poverty contribute materially to AIDS" 
(Chomsky, 2006). People li ving in poverty, which is 70 percent in rural areas and 50 percent overall 
(South Africa Information, 2007), are more susceptible to disease due to their inability to afford basic 
services such as water and medication. As Farmer (2001) exp lains AIDS is a di sease of inequality and 
poverty because "in an unequal world AIDS di sproportionately affects the poor" (in Mbali, 2004: 109). 
However, solely fighting poverty will not reduce the scale of the epidemic. Studies by 
Stillwaggon (2000: I 006) show that the chain of causation between poverty and epidemic infection 
passes through a link of poor nutrition and related subsequent immunosuppression, and that this occurs 
before HIV infection (in Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 19). Thus there is a need to fight poverty and AIDS 
43 Because of this comm itment , HIV/AIDS was left out of politics during the elections. However, by April 2004 an estimate 
of only 6000 people were receiving ARV treatment (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006: 366). 
"In the US, ARV treatment begins at a CD4 count ofSOO. A low CD4 counts indicates that the patient is unhealthy. 
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together, and not one or the other alone (Walker et ai, 2004: 129). As Marais (2000: 54) warns, 
contextualizing HIV and AIDS and linking it to socio economic and socio cultural dynamics are crucial 
platforms in locating an effective response. Controversy arises when the disease is so lely portrayed as a 
disease of poverty. Doing so creates notions of high and low risk groups, wh ich leads some people in 
low risk groups to believe that they are exempt from the virus and its impact45 , 
Fighting poverty and AIDS together requires a long-term commitment. Again , it is not on ly the 
price of ARVs that inhibits treatment or allows the spread of HI V and AIDS. Opportunistic infections, 
such as TB, also need to be treated. But the truth is that the state health care system does not have the 
capacity or infrastructure to treat those with HIV and AIDS. 
South Africa has a large public health sector that is under-resourced and over used. While the 
public sector services 80 percent of the population , most of the resources are concentrated in the private 
health sector, which services only 20 percent of the population (South Africa Information, 2007). It is 
important to note that, during apartheid , the public health system was built to serv ice the ' white' 
minority as well as prevent 'b lack ' diseases from spreading to 'wh ite' areas. Thus when the new 
government came into power, grave inequalities already existed in terms of infrastructure between rural 
and urban areas . What is making matters worse is that South Africa has a lucrative private health sector 
which is constantly growing but is only available to middle and high income individuals who can afford 
medical aid. HIV and AIDS places more pressure on an already weak public health care system because 
people get opportunistic infections, infants require care if the mother is HIV positive or has AIDS, 
counseling is required to get tested in the first place, treatment li teracy needs to form part of ARV 
administration, etc. Furthermore, most skilled medical professionals (excluding nurses) choose to work 
in the private sector and thus a shortage of ski lled staff exacerbates the problem. Consequently, any 
successful HIV and AIDS programme in South Africa requires a drastic improvement in the public 
health care system. Denialism allows the government to overlook the scale at which reconstruct ion in 
the public health sector is required, and thus ' lessens' the impact. This in turn serves to justify the 
expenses required to sustain neo liberal policies. 
"What this rhetoric46 ignores and often disguises is that the background for increasing HIV 
transmission is a background of neo-liberalism - a context where the rapid movement of capital is 
privileged over long-term investment and the abi lity of persons to secure their own livelihoods" (Basu, 
45 " We are all more alike than different, even ifonly on the basis of all being equally at ri sk" (Jones in Marais, 2000 : 59). 
46 This includes statements about poverty, culture, high prices of ARVs and denialism. which are all used to ignore the 
magnitude of HI V and AIDS and delay a response to it. 
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2003). Bond argues this point further when he says, it is "that the class/race/gender character of South 
African health and social policy under conditions of a failing free market (known here as neo liberal) 
economic strategy is inhibiting prevention" (Bond, 2007). Ironically , Mbeki cites poverty and inequality 
as major problems that need to be dealt with in order to reduce HIV and AIDS in South Africa, yet it is 
the government's neo liberal policies that sustain and amplify poverty and inequality. Neo-liberalism 
encompasses values such as privatization, deregulation, a reduction in public expenditure (usually in 
social services), and allows activities to be controlled by the invisible hand of the market. For example, 
the South African Customs Union (SACU) trade agreement with the US " promotes rapid liberalization 
and the movement of capital over the securing of stable investment and employment, privileging 
companies who wish to set up base temporarily and shift capital at will" (Basu, 2003). 
Evidence seems to suggest, that even though the South African government cites poverty 
reduction as more crucial than dealing with HIV and AIDS, its actions suggest otherwise. As Cameron 
notes, a dualism exists between governmental statement and action concerning AIDS, which the above 
factors illustrate. "HIV has the eerie capacity of magnifying our social ills, of underscoring our deepest 
fault lines , and so it is not surprising that it has been on the stage of the AIDS epidemic that the most 
contentious leadership dramas of our post-apartheid society have been played out" (Walker et ai, 2004: 
108). South Africa has both internal and external factors that constrain action, and these all play out in a 
globalizing world powered by neo liberal capitalism. Sadly, it appears as though those living with HIV 
and AIDS are "deemed unnecessary for capitalism's reproduction" (Bond, 2007). The requirements to 
combat HIV and AIDS go against neo liberal values and the relentless pursuit of profit, and instead 
necessitate emphasizing the value of human life regardless of monetary status. This is in opposition to 
the current status quo, an environment where intellectual property rights held by those in power thrive. 
As Mark Heywood comments: "the post-apartheid transition and the drama of political and social 
reconstruction has been accompanied by attempts to ignore, hide and marginalize the advance of the 
HIV and AIDS epidemic ". Thus any successful response to HIV and AIDS will force South Africa to 
deal with all of its problems and confront the consequences of apartheid wh ile at the same time 
remaining a global player. 
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Recent developments and Conclusions 
"The future of Southern Africa is dependent on governments in the region halting the effects of HIV and 
AIDS" said James Morris, the United Nations special envoy for humanitarian needs in Southern Africa 
(Mail & Guardian, 13 December 2006). Since South Africa ' s embarrassing display of garlic, lemon, 
African potatoes and beetroot as treatment for HIV and AIDS at the International AIDS Conference in 
Toronto in August 2006, the South African government has once again come under scrutiny from the 
international public with regard to its response to the epidemic. Shortly after the conference, 82 
international scientists and II South African researchers composed a letter to President Mbeki , arguing 
that garlic and lemons are not an appropriate response to the disease and that people were dying 
unnecessarily because they do not have access to ARVs that slow down the progression of the disease 
(Koenig, 2006: 1378). The international pressure appears to be working. Locally, activists, 
organ izations (notably the TAC) and scientists called for Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang's 
resignation or, failing that, for her to be fired, although neither action has been taken so far. 
Furthermore, SANAC was revived with the Deputy President at the head instead of the Health Minister 
(Koenig, 2006: 1378). In October of that year, represented by a team headed by Deputy President 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and Deputy Health minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, the government 
altered its usual reluctance to work with civil society. However, the founder of the TAC, Zackie 
Achmat, commented: "There's no question there's been a sea change [by the government] in terms of 
dealing with civil society, but there hasn't been a sea change yet in saving lives" (JOL, 6 November 
2006). Though its actions are commended, the South African government's failure to provide an 
effective and timely response to the epidemic has led to the country having nine out of the ten highest 
prevalence rates in the world. A recent report by the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) states 
that, around the world, there are a total of 15.2 million AIDS orphans with the majority, 1.2 million, 
residing in South Africa (fOL, 17 January 2007). Although the government eventually agreed to provide 
ARVs in the public sector in 200347, only 200 000 people are currently on treatment, but a further 800 
000 need it (Mail & Guardian, 29 November 2006). A UN report showed that 79 percent of those who 
required ARV treatment in South Africa were not receiving it (JOL, 24 December 2006). This is a direct 
result of the South African government 's delay in taking action to curb the epidemic effectively. 
47 The government only began its roll out programme in April 2004. 
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On World AIDS Day in 2006, the South African government launched its new and improved 
HIV and AIDS policy. The Broad Framework/or H1V & AiDS and STi Strategic Plan/or South A/rica, 
2007-2011'8 "represents the country's multi-sectoral response to the challenge with HIV infection and 
the wide-ranging impact on AIDS" (Broad Framework/or HIV and AIDS and STi Strategic Plan/or 
South Africa 2007-2011,2006). The plan aims to reduce the new HIV infection rate by 50 percent 
(prevention), reduce the morbidity and mortality rates and lessen the socio economic impact of the 
epidemic by providing support to 80 percent of those who need it (amelioration), provide monitoring 
and evaluation on the scale of the epidemic (planning) and finally to uphold legal and human rights by 
lessening stigma and discrimination (amelioration again). Though the effectiveness of the new plan has 
yet to be tested, and activists still view the government's response to HIV and AIDS with skepticism , 
Tony Leon, until recently head of the opposition party in South Africa, the Democratic Alliance, said its 
mere existence "can only be considered a mammoth step forward from the moribund , not to say 
vegetative, policies of the health minister" (Mail & Guardian, I December 2006). Yet despite this, 
critics point out that Mbeki himself is still silent on the issue and this continues to breed uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the infamous health minister, dubbed "Dr Beetroot", issued a statement in November 2006 
" lash ing out at her critics and reaffirming her commitment to nutrition and traditional medicine in HIV 
and AIDS treatment" (Koenig, 2006: 1379). These opposing views within the government further serve 
to breed not only confusion but also cast doubts about the effectiveness of the new AIDS plan and the 
government's commitment to it. Moreover, it is clear that issues of infrastructure and state capac ity need 
to be looked at to ensure that the goals set out in the new AIDS plan will be achieved. South African 
po li cy-makers definitely have a blueprint for what a successful HIV and AIDS plan should no/ look like 
but, like its predecessor, the new AIDS plan requires changes across sectors and on broad issues such as 
race, class, gender, poverty, unemployment and inequality in order to be successful. Nattrass (in van 
Wyk, 2004) notes that "the burden of AIDS will thus continue to be borne unevenly in South Africa. 
This is largely because of South Africa's high unemployment rate and the strong connection between 
unemployment, poverty and HIV infection". Complicating matters further is the fact that there is a 
newer more virulent strain ofTB emerging as an epidemic amongst those who are HIV positive 
(Koenig, 2006: 1379). There is also the threat ofa drug resistant form ofTB. In November 2006, the 
National Health Department said 303 cases of the extreme drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis (XDR-
" The full text can be found at hnp: llwww.info.gov.za/issues/hiv/framework.pdf 
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TB) had been identified nationall / 9 (Mail & Guardian, 30 November 2006). This is particularly 
threatening for those who are HIV positive and already have compromised immune systems. " We've got 
two epidemics clashing in a dangerous way. We can't carryon with business as usual ," says 
immunologist Linda-Gail Bekker, co-director of the Desmond Tutu HIV Center in Cape Town (in 
Koenig, 2006: 1379). Undeniably AIDS "is a public health crisis, which not only has deep social roots, 
but challenges the very notion of what it means to be a society" (Nattrass in van Wyk, 2004), not on ly 
on a national level but on an international level as well. 
In its annual report for 2006, the New York based human rights group, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), commented that South Africa had failed to implement its human rights obligations as outlined 
in the constitution. "Particular areas of concern relate to the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers, sexual violence against women and children, access to primary education in rural areas, and the 
government's response to one of the world's most serious HIV and AIDS epidemics" (JOL, II January 
2007). A ll of these factors are intertw ined and relate to the ever-increasing HIV and AIDS prevalence 
rates. For a while poverty was given higher priority than the epidemic but, as the Brazilian example 
suggests, a multi-sectoral response, like the one initially outlined by NACO SA and now present in the 
new HIV and AIDS plan, is required to combat the epidemic. This is because HIV and AIDS knows no 
boundaries. It crosses class, race and gender margins and unfortunately, because of the appalling living 
conditions the poor find themselves in, they are most adversely affected by the epidemic. As Nelson 
Mandela proclaimed at the International AIDS Conference in Paris in 2003: "AIDS is no longer a 
disease, it is a human rights issue". HR W adds that the world needs to acknowledge that human rights 
abuses fuel the epidemic, and calls for countries to crack down on human rights abuses (Mail & 
Guardian, 21 July 2006). 
Although different factors vary in scope, none illustrates more ev idently a denial of human 
rights, more evidently than the high prices pharmaceutical companies are able to charge for ARV 
treatment. This is due to the 20-year monopolies they receive on new drugs when filing for a patent, as 
outlined and protected in the TRIPS Agreement. Even the Doha Declaration on Public Health, which 
affirmed the right of a country to put patient before patent ri ghts, has not helped to ensure that more 
countries facing a HIV and AIDS epidemic use its provisions. Significantly, it is the developing 
countries that experience the bulk of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, and therefore all of the issues 
surrounding access have been experienced by developing countries . This phenomenon has exacerbated 
49 Of those, 263 cases were reported in KwaZulu-Natal. 
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the North-South divide at a time when we live in a globalizing world. It comes about because one of the 
biggest consequences of globalization is the expansion of international trade (Pastor, 2006). So that 
MNCs have come to playa more prominent role in world politics, and in most cases surpass the power 
of the state50 Against such a background, the pharmaceutical industry was instrumental in bringing 
about the TRIPS Agreement, which outlines the minimum patent protection standards a WTO signatory 
can have. This patent system adheres to a utilitarian notion of patents, which states that patents are 
needed to provide incentive for R&D as well as to promote technology transfer. In the case of 
medicines, much money is needed for R&D to cover both successful and failed attempts and the 
exercise of patents allows MNCs to charge for medicines as they see fit. The state protects new ideas by 
issuing a patent which, under TRIPS, grants a 20-year monopoly for a product or process. Although 
patents are not called into question, what is questioned are the excessive levels of patent protection 
given to drugs which could ameliorate the HlY and AIDS epidemic. Medicines are not just another 
commodity. They save lives. Failure to gain access to essential medic ines, such as ARYs, results in a 
violation of the human right to health, and sometimes to life itself. 
This creates a dichotomy. On the one hand , there is an outcomes-based approach which looks 
past patent protection in favour of human life, and on the other hand, there is a process-based approach 
which holds the view that IP is a fundamental right and must be protected by the state. This places the 
state in the middle of the debate, because it needs to uphold IPRs as outlined in TRIPS as well as defend 
human rights which are protected by the South African constitution and the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. According to Rawls ' theory of justice, basic human rights trump IPRs, and if 
redistribution will benefit the least advantaged in society, then the distribution is just. Even in South 
Africa, where a HIY and AIDS epidemic is rife, providing ARYs to the public sector poses many 
challenges. If, on the other hand, Nozick's libertarian view is followed, patent protection remains strong 
and the epidemic may be allowed to run unchecked as a result of high-priced ARYs. Nattrass 
successfull y shows that the South African government cannot afford not to provide ARYs, and whilst 
research demonstrates that any HIY and AIDS policy cannot be successful without including ARYs. In 
South Africa, the majority of people who need ARYs cannot afford them. It is thus up to the state to 
administer treatment. However, as has been shown, the government for the most part has been reluctant 
to administer ARYs to the public sector. It was onl y in response to fierce public campaigning and 
activism that the government recently changed its stance . The same applies to pharmaceutical 
50 Even though the state is needed in order for a MNC to function. 
57 
companies. In Thailand, for example, it took activists three years of hard work before Britsol-Myer 
Squibb (BMS) gave the patent on Didanosine51 (ddI) to the people of Thailand. As thi s example, the 
PMA case and countless others illustrate, offers of reduced prices on ARVs by pharmaceutical 
companies are the result of hard work and not corporate benevolence (Cameron & Geffen, 2005: 178). 
Something thus needs to be done because one cannot rely on the goodwill of pharmaceutical 
companies. But is there an alternative? Ifpatents impede access due to the hi gh prices that patent owners 
are allowed to charge, which in turn makes the medication largely unavailable to those who need it, 
surely the patent holder can be rewarded in another way? A way needs to be found which would not 
only cover R&D costs but also acknowledge the inventor's efforts. Examples which come to mind 
include public funding, acknowledgment, research grants, status, etc. This view, however begs the 
question of what a fitting payment wou ld be, and that would require an investigation into alternatives 
other than patents. In today's capitali st society, where the main incentive is profit, what reward could be 
more fitting than that which a patent offers? This is not to say that profit is the only factor, but it is the 
main one. Also to be considered is the fact that, in the pharmaceutical industry, money is needed to fund 
R&D, and patents at present appear to provide the best means to do this. 
Although a great deal has been done to lower the prices of life-saving anti-AIDS drugs, much 
more effort is still needed to ensure that patents do not impede access to essential medicines. Recently 
Novartis52, a multinational pharmaceutical company, legally challenged India's patent laws (JOL, 20 
December 2006). India only began granting patents under the TRIPS Agreement in 2005, and has a large 
generic manufacturing sector which supplies most of the world with generic medicines. For example, 
India produced 80 percent of the generic medicines used to treat the 80 000 people for MSF's AIDS 
projects in over 30 countries (JOL, 20 December 2006). When urged to drop the case by MSF, Novartis 
said that they had a "strong commitment to defending international intellectual property standards" and 
that they had a right to do so under the TRIPS Agreement (JOL, 20 December 2006). This serves as 
warning that, despite previous victories that were hailed as benchmarks, pharmaceutical companies will 
keep testing the limits of the TRIPS Agreement. And it is this relentless pursuit of increased IP 
protection by pharmaceutical companies that serves to undermine the ethos of the Doha Declaration as 
well as develop ing countries' ability to use its provisions and safeguards. Because TRIPS sets a global 
" ddt stops the growth ofJ-I]V, so helps fight AIDS, and is usually used in combination with other groups ofJ-I]V 
medications. 
52 Novartis was also one of the pharmaceutical companies which sued the South African government regarding the Medicines 
Act. 
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patent standard, a single pharmaceutical company's actions has repercussions for the rest of the world, 
and in this case, ifNovartis is successful, access to life-saving drugs will once again diminish. 
Moreover, the coupling of trade issues with intellectual property issues has not allowed the 
TRIPS Agreement to set minimum blanket standards, but has instead permitted other trade issues to be 
used as bargaining tools by mainly developed countries to gain more stringent protection for intellectual 
property laws on a global scale. For example, the US has utilized many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
with countries such as Peru (specifically on knowledge production), Australia (specifically on copyright) 
and Chile (on pharmaceuticals). Chile's local pharmaceutical industry accounts for 90 percent of the 
country's public health sector. It is worth noting that the Chilean United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CHUSFTA) has no reference to the Doha Declaration of Public Health and uses IPR as an end instead 
of an instrument to promote economic development (Pastor, 2006). It is becoming clear that these 
TRIPS-plus provisions produce clear winners (US) and losers (Chile). Furthermore, even though the US 
is the only state enforcing TRIPS-plus provisions, pharmaceutical companies situated in other developed 
countries still reap the benefits of the TRIPS-plus provisions by remaining neutral. A recent report by 
Oxfam International agrees that FTAs and inaction on the part of rich developed countries undermines 
and disrespects the Doha Declaration, and goes further to recommend that pharmaceutical companies 
need to stop campaigning for stronger IP protection (Malpani & Kamal-Yanni , 2006). By pressuring 
developing nations to enter FTAs that require more stringent IP protection, the US - as well as rich 
nations and pharmaceutical companies - constrain the policy space available to developing countries to 
devi se and implement policies that are in line with their developmental goals (Pastor, 2006). 
The quest to curb the HIV and AIDS epidemic begins with getting treatment to those who need 
it. Treatment does not only lessen the impact of the epidemic on the public health care system, but also 
allows many to live a longer life in some dignity. Granted that ARVs are toxic and do have serious side 
effects, they also more often than not save lives. However, securing access to such medicines in order to 
combat HIV and AIDS is only the tip of the iceberg. The South African government needs to fight two 
battles, one internationally and one domestically, because unless the dichotomy between lPRs and 
accessible treatment is acknowledged, any efforts will be short-lived, and the 320 000 people that died 
of AIDS in South Africa in 2006 will only be last year's much lower statistic. 
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During the writing of this thesis 2.9 million died of AIDS, 4.3 million new HIV infections occurred, 39.5 
million people are currently living with HIVand AIDS and out of the 6.8 million people who need life 
saving AIDS drugs, only 1.65 million are receiving them (based on statistics supported in Avert, 2007). 
60 
Bibliography 
Adede, A.O. 2001 , 'The Political Economy of the TRIPS Agreement: origins and history of 
negotiations', accessed 2 May 2006, <http:www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2001-07-30/Adede.pdf>. 
Alsegard, E. 2004, 'Global pharmaceutical patents after the Doha Declaration- what lies in the future?' , 
accessed 2 May 2006, <http://www.law.ed.ac.uklahrb/acripted/docs/doha.asp>. 
Anderson, L. 2002, ' The conflict between intellectual property rights pharmaceutical companies and the 
right to health of AIDS victims in SA ', accessed 13 March 2006, <www.globalpol itics.net>. 
Angell , M. 2004, 'The truth about drug companies ' in New York Book Review Volume 5 I , Number 12, 
15 July. 
Avafia, T. 2005, 'TRIPS and Public Health : the unresolved debate ', accessed 6 November 2006, 
<http://www.tralac.orglscripts/content.php? id=3716>. 
Avert 2006, accessed 24 December 2006, <http ://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm>. 
Avert 2007, accessed 2 I January 2007, <http ://www.avert.orglworldstats.htm>. 
Baker, B. 2003, 'Analysis and response to WTO action regarding paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ', accessed 2 May 2006, <www.healthgap.org>. 
Barnard, D. 2002, ' In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98: the global politics of access to 
low cost AIDS drugs in poor countries ' in Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal Volume 12.2, p 159- 174. 
Barnett, T., and Whites ide, A. 2006. AIDS in the 21S ' Century: disease and globalization (second 
edition). Macmillan: London. 
Basu, S. 2003, ' AIDS, Empire and Public Health Behaviouralism', accessed Jan uary 2007, 
<http ://www.zmag.orgicontent/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=3985>. 
Bate, Rand Tren, R, 2005 'Brazil's AIDS Program: a costly success ' in American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research Number I, P 1-9, accessed 18 December 2006, 
<http://www.aei.orglpu bl ications/pubID .2357 6/pu b _ detai l.asp>. 
Bell , W. , n.d. ' Why Reform of the WTO is not on the agenda' , accessed 24 August 2006, 
<www.zmag.org>. 
Berger, J. 2006, ' Keeping pressure on the availability and affordability of medicines' in AIDS Law 
Project: annual review 2005-2006, 
Berkman, A. 2002, 'The global AIDS crisis: human rights, international pharmaceutical markets and 
intellectual property' in The Connecticut Journal of International Law Volume 17, pi 48 - 155 . 
61 
Bhat, V.N. 2005, 'Patent Term Extension in the Pharmaceutical Industry' in Pharmaceuticals Policy 
and Law Volume 6, p 109- 122. 
Black, I. 1997. Oxford Economic Diclionwy. Oxford: OUP. 
Bond, P., 2007, accessed January 2007, <http://www.zmag.org/bondsaaids.htm>. 
Brighouse, H. 2004. Justice. Polity Press: Cambridge. 
Broad Frameworkfor HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007-201 1, 2006, 
accessed 20 January 2007, <http://www.info.gov.zaiissues/hiv/framework.pdf>. 
Buchanan, A., 1984, 'The right to a decent minimum of health care ' in Philosophy and Public Affairs 
Volume 13, Number I, p5 5-78. 
Butler, A. , 2005, 'South Africa's HIV AND AIDS Policy, 1994-2004: How Can it be Explained?' in 
African Affairs Volume 104, Number 417, p 591-6 14. 
Capsey, S.R. 1973. Patents; an introduction for Engineers and Scientists. London: Newnes-
Butterworths. 
Cameron, E. 2005. Witness to AIDS. Tafelburg: Cape Town. 
Cameron, E. & Geffen, M. 2005, ' We are not the Red Cross - Patents, profits and death from AIDS' in 
Witness to AIDS. Tafelberg: Cape Town. 
Chase, M. "Gates won't fund AIDS researchers unless they pool data" in The Wall Street Journal, 21 
Jul y 2006. 
Chomsky, N., 1993, Year 501, accessed 9 November 2006, 
<http://zmag.org/forums/chomforumacrh.htm>. 
Chomsky, N., 2006, accessed 24 August 2006, <http: //www.zmag.org/chomaidsforum.htm>. 
Consensus statement of AR V treatment for AIDS in poor countries by Individual members of the faculty 
of Harvard University, n.d. accessed 18 August 2006, 
<http://www.aids.harvard.edu/conferences _ events/200 I Iconsensus _aids_therapy>. 
CPT (Consumer Project on Technology) 2006, accessed 18 December 2006, 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html> . 
CPT (Consumer Project on Technology) 1999, accessed 18 December 2006, 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/amsterdamstatement.html>. 
Corn ish, W.R. 1997. In tellectual Property (3,d ed). London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
62 
Davidson, Land Greblov, G. 2005, 'The Pharmaceutical Industry in the Global Economy', accessed 20 
January 2007, 
<http://www.bus.indiana.edu/davidso/lifesciences//researchpapers/pharmaceutical%20industryaugI2.do 
c>. 
Ferreira, L., 2003, 'Access to affordable HIV AND AIDS drugs: the human rights ob ligations of 
multinational pharmaceutical corporations ' in Fordham Law Review Volume 71, P 1133-1180. 
Geffen, N. 2001, ' An explanation of the Medicines Act and the implication of the court victory' , 
accessed 24 April 2006, <http ://www.globaltreatmentaccess.orgicontenticamp/SA/SA.html#fact> . 
Gewertz, N and Amado, R. , 2004, 'Intellectual property and the pharmaceutical industry: a moral cross 
roads between health and property ' in Journal of Business Ethics Volume 55, p 295-308. 
Grubb, P. 1982. Patents for Chemists. Oxford: OUP. 
Hett inger, E., 1989, 'Justifying Intellectual Property' in Philosophy and Public Affairs Volume 18, 
Number I, Winter, p3 I-52. 
Head, 1., 1993, ' AIDS in South Africa: The Democratic Movement Responds' in Southern Africa Report 
Volume 8, Number 5, I May, p25. 
Heywood, M. , 'The Price of Denial ', n.d . accessed 24 December 2006, <www.tac.org.za>. 
HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa 2000-2005, accessed 24 December 2006, 
<http ://www.info.gov.zalotherdocs/2000/aidsplan2000.pdf>. 
Horton, R., 2000, 'African AIDS Beyond Mbeki: Tripping into Anarchy' in The Lancet Volume 356, 
Issue 9241 , April, p 1541 . 
JOL. "South Africa has most AIDS orphans - UN". 17 January 2007. 
JOL. "Mlambo-Ngcuka denies HIV and Aids coup". 6 November 2006. 
IOL. "Hail to Nozizwe - the beetroot-slayer". 24 December 2006. 
IOL. "SA hasn't implemented human rights". II January 2007. 
JOL. "Drop patent challenge, drug company urged". 20 December 2006. 
Jon i, 1. , 2002, ' Access to treatment for HIV AND AIDS: a human rights issue in the developing world ' 
in The Connecticut Journal of International Law Volume 17, p273-280. 
63 
Joseph, S. 2003 "Pharmaceutical Corporations and access to drugs". Human Rights Quarterly Volume 
25, Number 2, p 425-452. 
Kaiser Network 2003, accessed 18 December 2006, 
<http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily _reports/rep _ index .cfm?DR _ ID= 18176>. 
Kasper, T. 200 I, ' South Africa ' s victory for the developing world' in Africa Recovery Volume 15, 1-2, 
June, p 14. 
Katz, A. 2003 ' AIDS in Africa: the international community's response is neo-liberal , racist, and 
guaranteed to fail in Z Magazine Volume 16, number 9, September. 
Khor, M. 2001. Relhinking Globalizalion. Sage Publications: New York 
Koenig, R., 2006, ' South Africa Bolsters HIV AND AIDS plan, but obstacles remain ' in Science 
Volume 314, Number 5804, I December, p 1378-1379. 
Kremer, M., 2002, ' Pharmaceuticals and the developing world ' in The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives Volume 16, number 4, p 67-90. 
Lehman, B., 2004, ' Keynote address to the Global Public Policy Institute' , accessed 20 October 2006, 
<http://www.iipi.org/speeches/Paris0604.pdf>. 
Love, J. 2001, ' Report on court case over South African Medicines Act', accessed 15 March 2006, 
<http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-pol icy/200 I-March/0007 40.htm I>. 
Mail and Guardian. "Mixed Messages from Government". 10 March 2000. 
Mail and Guardian. "Africans not Dying of AIDS: Dissident". 9 April 2001. 
Mail and Guardian. "Mbeki Cl ings to Bizarre AIDS Stance". 11 September 2000. 
Mail and Guardian. "Editoria l: Denialists Twaddle". 8 August 2003. 
Mail and Guardian. "Mbekis Panel will Question AIDS". 23 March 200 I. 
Mail and Guardian. "Still Failing to Grasp AIDS Nettle" . 9 June 2000. 
Mail & Guardian. "UN highlights AIDS threat to Southern Africa". 12 December 2006. 
Mail & Guardian. "Human rights abuses fue l Aids pandemic". 21 July 2006. 
Mail & Guardian. "SA unveils ambitious new Aids plan". 1 December 2006. 
64 
Mail & Guardian. "Report: Drug-resistant TB at 39 KZN hospital s". 30 November 2006. 
Malpani, R & Kamal-Yanni, M. n.d. 'Patents vs. Patients: Five years after the Doha Declaration', 
accessed 2 May 2007, <http ://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do~issues/health/bp95yatents.htm/> . 
Marais, H. 2000 'To the Edge: AIDS Review 2000', accessed 24 December 2007, 
<http://www.csa.za.org/filemanager/li st/3/>. 
Martin, B. , 1995, 'Against intellectua l property' in Philosophy and Social Action Volume I , Number 3, 
September, p7-22. 
Maskus , K. 2000. Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy. NW: Washington DC. 
Matowe, L. , 2004, ' Access to essential drugs in developing countries: a lost battle?' in AM J Health Syst 
Pharm Volume 61, p 718-721. 
Mayne, R & Bailey, M. n.d. ' TRIPS and Public Health: the next battle ', accessed I May 2006, 
<http ://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we _ do/issues/health/downloads/bp 15 _trips.rtf> . 
Mbali, M., 2004, 'AIDS discourses and the South African state: government denialism and post 
apartheid policy making' in Transformation Volume 54, p 104-122. 
Meerkotter, A., Hardy, c., Hassim, A., and Hassan, F. 2006, 'Protecting and Promoting Human Rights: 
Litigation and Paralegal Services ' in AIDS Law Project Annual Review 2005-2006. 
Narlikar, A. 2005. The WTO: a very short introduction. Oxford: OUP. 
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 
NYT (The New York Times). " Free Trade and AIDS Drugs". 28 March 2006. 
Nielsen, K., 2005, 'Global ization as a Tool for Imperialism' in Dalhouse Review Volume 5, pI83-193. 
Ostergard Jr., R., 1999, 'Intellectual Property: a universal human right?' in Human Rights Quarterly 
Volume 21, Number I, pI56-178. 
Pastor, R., 2006. ' The impact ofFTAs on Intel lectual Property standards in a post-TRIPS world' , 
accessed 2 May 2007, <http ://www.bilaterals.orglarticle .php3 ?id_article=4311 >. 
Pellegrino, E., 1999, 'The commodification of medical and health care: the moral consequences of a 
paradigm shift from a professional to a market ethic' in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Volume 24, 
Number 4, p 243-266. 
65 
Pogge, T., 2005, ' World Poverty and Human Rights ' in The Journal of Ethics Volume 19, Number I, 
pl-7. 
Rawls, J. 2003. Justice as Fairness: a restatement. Harvard University Press: USA. (Third edition edited 
by E. Kelly) . 
Sacco, S.F. , 2005, ' A comparative study of the implementation in Zimbabwe and South Africa of the 
international law rules that allow compulsory li censing and parallel importation for HIV and AIDS 
drugs'in African Human Rights Journal Volume 5, p 105-128. 
Sassen, S., 2003, 'Africa and the Warlord: global protests did help poor countries over drugs and AIDS 
but the counterattack has begun' in UK Guardian, I I July, accessed 24 December 2006, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/slory/0.3604.994216.00.html> . 
Schechter, D., 2000, accessed 24 August 2006, <http://www.zmag.orglZSustainers/ZDai ly/2000-
0711 3schechter.htm>. 
Schneider, H,. and Stein, J., 200 1, ' Implementing AIDS Policy in Post Apartheid South Africa' in 
Social Science and Medicine Vo lume 52, p723-731. 
Schoeman, M. 2001. "South Africa's Political Economy in a Global Context" in Venter, A (ed). 
Government and Politics in the New South Africa. Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria. 
Scholte, J. 1997. "The globalization of world politics" in Baylis, J and Smith, S. The globalization of 
world politics. Oxford: OUP. 
Shiva, V. 2001. Protect or plunder? Understanding intellectual property rights. Southern Africa: David 
Phillip Publishers. 
South Africa Information 2007, accessed 4 January 2007, 
<http://www.southafrica.info/essjnfo/sa_glance/health/923087.htm> . 
Sykes, A.O., 2002, 'TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha Solution ' in Chicago 
Journal o/International Law Volume 3, Number I , p 47-68 . 
The Corporation 2005, DVD. A film by Achbar, M., Abbott, J and Bakan, J. 
't Hoen, E. , 2002, 'TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: a long way from 
Seattle to Doha ' in Chicago Journal 0/ International Law Volume 3, Number I, p27-46. 
Thomas, J.R. 2001, 'HIV AND AIDS Drugs, Patents and the TRIPS Agreement: Issues and Options', 
accessed 2 May 2006, 
<http://www .Iaw. umaryland.edu/marshalllcrsreports/crsdocumenls/RL3 I 066. pdf>. 
66 
Van Eeckhaute, J. 2002, 'The debate on the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines in the WTO: 
Doha and beyond' in Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law Volume 5, p 11-24. 
Van Wyk, B. 2004, ' Book rev iew: The Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa by N. Nattrass' , 
accessed 20 January 2007, <hnp :i/www.csa.za.org/article/articieview/272/1/7/> . 
Vodovn ik, Z. 2004, 'WTO derailed: a concise hi story', accessed 16 July 2006, <www.zmag.org>. 
Walker, L., Reid , G., and Cornell, M. 2004. Waiting to Happen: HIV and AIDS in South Africa. 
Colorado: Double Storey. 
Walker, S. 2002, 'The implications of TRIPS: ethics, health and human rights' in Journal of Human 
Development Volume 2, Number I , pi 09-114. 
Wellman, C. 2002. "Justice" in Simon, R (ed). The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosphy. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wolff, J. 1991 . Robert Nozick Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Polity Press: Cambridge. 
WHO (World Health Organization) 2007, accessed 20 January 2007, <www.who.org>. 
WIPO (World Intell ectual Property Organization) 2006, accessed 19 July 2006, <www.wipo.org>. 
WTO (World Trade Organizat ion) 2003, accessed in 2 May 2006, <www.wto.org>. 
Zelleke, A. "Distributive justice and the argument for basic income" for the USBIG Discussion Paper 
Number 59, February 2003. 
67 
Appendix 1: 
Glossary of acronyms and abbreviations 
AAC - AIDS Advisory Committee 
AIDS - Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome 
ANC - Afr ican National Congress 
ARVs - anti-retrovirals 
AZT - Azidothymidine 
BI - Boehringer Ingelheim 
BMS - Bristol Myer Squibb 
CBOs - Community Based Organization 
CD4 - Cluster of Differentiation 4 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer 
CHUSFTA - Chilean Un ited States Free Trade Agreement 
CPT - Consumer Project on Technology 
ddI - Didanosine 
EC - European Commission 
EPC - European Patent Convention 
EPO - European Patent Office 
EU - European Union 
FDA - Federal Drug Association 
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment 
FT A - Free Trade Agreement 
GA IT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GOP - Gross Domestic Product 
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline 
HAl - Health Action International 
HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HRW - Human Rights Watch 
I MF - International Monetary Fund 
IP - Intellectual Property 
I PRs - Intellectual Property Rights 
ITO - International Trade Organization 
LDCs - Least Developed Countries 
MCC - Medicines Control Council 
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MNCs - Multi National Corporations 
MSF - Medicines sans Frontiers 
MTC - Mother-to-child 
NACOSA - National AIDS Committee of South Africa 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement 
NGO - Non Governmental Organization 
PCT - Patent Co-operation Treaty 
PMA - Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
R&D - Research and Development 
RDP - Reconstruction and Development Programme 
SACU - South African Customs Union 
SADC - Southern African Development Community 
SANAC - South African National AIDS Committee 
STls - Sexually Transmitted Infections 
T AC - Treatment Action Campaign 
TB - Tuberculosis 
TRC - Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
TRIPS - Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
UDF - United Democratic Front 
UN - United Nations 
Unicef - United Nations Children's Fund 
US - United States 
WHO - World Health Organization 
WIPO - World Intellectual Property Organization 
WTO - World Trade Organization 
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Appendix 2: 
Relevant TRIPS Articles referred to in text 
Article 6 Exhaustion 
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of 
Articl es 3 and 4 noth ing in thi s Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights. 
Article 27 Patentable Subject Maller 
I. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. 53 Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without di scrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced. 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect 
human, animal or plant li fe or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exc lusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
3. Members may also exc lude from patentability: 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes fo r the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of thi s 
subparagraph shall be rev iewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. 
Article 28 Rights Conferred 
I. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclus ive rights: 
53 For the purposes of this Article, the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industria l application" may be deemed by a 
Member to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful" respecti vely. 
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(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, se lling, or importingS4 
for these purposes that product; 
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering 
for sal e, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by 
that process . 
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by success ion, the patent and to 
conclude licensing contracts. 
Article 30 Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided 
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties. 
Article 31 Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder 
Where the law ofa Member allows for other usess of the subject matter ofa patent without the 
authori zation of the right holder, including use by the government or third parti es authorized by the 
government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts 
to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right 
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of 
public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent 
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used 
by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
(c) the scope and du ration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was 
authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technol ogy shall only be fo r public non-
54 This right, like all other rights conferred under thi s Agreement in respect of the use, sale, importation or other distributi on 
of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6. 
55 "Other use" refers to use other than that allowed under Art icle 30. 
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commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive; 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill 
which enjoys such use ; 
(I) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of 
the Member authorizing such use; 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate 
interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated ifand when the circumstances 
which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall 
have the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these 
circumstances; 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, 
taking into account the economic value of the authorization; 
(i) the legal validity of any deci sion relating to the authorization of such use shall be subject 
to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that 
Member; 
U) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject 
to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that 
Member; 
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (I) 
where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive 
practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such 
cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of 
authorization if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to 
recur; 
(I) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the second patent") 
which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent ("the first patent"), the 
following additional conditions shall apply: 
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical 
advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention 
claimed in the first patent ; 
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be ent itled to a cross-licence on reasonable 
terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent ; and 
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(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-assignable 
except with the assignment of the second patent. 
Article 33 Term of Protection 
The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration ofa period of twenty years 
counted from the filing date. s6 
Article 39 
I. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in 
Article I Obis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in 
accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in 
accordance with paragraph 3. 
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within 
their control from being disclosed to, ac~uired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner 
contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such information: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly 
of its components, generally known among or readi Iy accessible to persons within the 
circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question ; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in 
control of the information, to keep it secret. 
3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submiss ion of undi sclosed test or 
other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against un fair 
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against di sclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against 
unfair commercial use. 
56 It is understood that those Members which do not have a system of original grant may provide that the term of protection 
shall be computed from the filing date in the system of original grant. 
57 For the purpose of this provision, "a manner contrary to honest commercial practices" shall mean at least practices such as 
breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information 
by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such pract ices were involved in the acquisition . 
